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Gregory Dolin∗
Irina D. Manta ∗∗
Abstract
The America Invents Act (AIA) was widely hailed as a remedy
to the excessive number of patents that the Patent & Trademark
Office issued, and especially ones that would later turn out to be
invalid. In its efforts to eradicate “patent trolls” and fend off other
ills, however, the AIA introduced serious constitutional problems
that this Article brings to the fore. We argue that the AIA’s new
“second-look” mechanisms in the form of Inter Partes Review
(IPR) and Covered Business Method Review (CBMR) have greatly
altered the scope of vested patent rights by modifying the
boundaries of existing patents. The changes in the boundaries of
the patent grant made it significantly more likely that the patent
owner would see his patent invalidated. This new state of affairs
has already reduced the value of some patents that were obtained
before the AIA became effective, and further declines will likely
follow. We show on the basis of constitutional takings
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jurisprudence that the loss of value that some patent owners have
suffered as a result of the new procedures—even if their patents
have not been specifically subjected to them—potentially compare
with physical takings and definitely fall under the umbrella of
regulatory takings. The way to remedy these failings is for the
government either to change its procedures or provide just
compensation to the patent owners that received patents from the
PTO before the enactment of the AIA.
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I. Introduction
This Article demonstrates for the first time that recent
changes in patent law have yielded unconstitutional results by
forcing a taking of patent owners’ property. We show that the
new post-issuance proceedings under the America Invents Act
(AIA) 1 have occasioned a permanent reduction in the value of
patents granted before the enactment of the Act. Patent owners
have a colorable claim that this redrawing of the boundaries of
their intellectual property resembles a physical taking, and they
have an even stronger claim that they have suffered a regulatory
taking without just compensation. We argue that the most
straightforward solution to this significant problem is either to
change the scope of post-issuance review procedures or to make
pre-AIA patents ineligible for such review. 2
In 2011, after a decades-long debate, Congress enacted a
series of patent reforms meant to decrease the cost of patent
1. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections
of 28 and 35 U.S.C.).
2. See infra Part VI (arguing that “only legislative or judicial intervention”
can solve the takings issues raised by the AIA).
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litigation, reduce the number of “dubious” or improperly granted
patents, and increase the certainty of patent rights. 3 The
mechanism that Congress chose to accomplish these goals is an
increase of power of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 4 to
adjudicate certain patent disputes in quasi-judicial, yet
ultimately administrative proceedings. 5 Under the new postissuance review procedures, a number of challenges to patent
validity can now be adjudicated in the PTO, rather than in court. 6
The objectives of the new system are faster and more consistent
outcomes. 7 These twin goals are supposed to be achieved by
having an expert body of specialized Administrative Patent
Judges adjudicate the disputes 8 and imposing strict statutory
deadlines on resolving the cases. 9 Reduction in costs and increase
3. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 284 (2011) (noting that the bill
was “to provide for patent reform”); Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56
B.C. L. REV. 881, 881–82 (2015) [hereinafter Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform]
(noting Congress’s attempt to reform the patent system and the problems it was
trying to address).
4. Prior to 1881, when trademark registration and examination were
added to its functions, the PTO was known simply as the “Patent Office.” See Ty
Halasz, Comment, The Game of the Name: Shortcomings in the Dual-Agency
Review of Drug Trademarks and a Remedial Cure, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 235, 241
(2012) (describing the history of the patent office, beginning with the Patent Act
of 1793).
5. See Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 487, 498–99 (2012) (describing how Congress gave the PTO wide discretion
in the AIA to prioritize and adjudicate patent claims).
6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–329 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46–48
(2011).
7. See id. at 38–40 (noting the purpose of the law); Jonathan Tamimi,
Note, Breaking Bad Patents: The Formula for Quick, Inexpensive Resolution of
Patent Validity, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 587, 587 (2014) (expressing hope that
these better outcomes will help stop some of the “innovation-stifling” effects of
the previous system).
8. See PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-01356EJD, 2014 WL 116340, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) (“Indeed, allowing these
invalidity arguments to be determined once, employing the specialized expertise
of the PTO, produces the exact results—avoiding duplicative costs and efforts
and averting the possibility of inconsistent judgments—intended by the AIA and
previous procedures.”).
9. See Andrew Byrnes, Standing Sentinel over Innovation: The Importance
of a Balanced and Effective IP System, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 617, 628 (2015) (noting
how the procedures allowed by the AIA are faster than those in the federal court
system).
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in speed, however, were not the only aims of the 2011 AIA
reforms. 10 Instead, much of the debate was focused on the
problem of so-called “patent trolls” or entities whose business
model is not the in-house production of tangible goods but rather
the licensing of their inventions who engage in such production. 11
Congress was convinced that “patent trolls” are a significant
drain on the economy and that measures must be taken to reduce
the ability of the “trolls” to “blackmail” other companies into
payments of supposedly unwarranted licensing fees. 12 Congress
became convinced that many issued patents should have never
seen the light of day13 and that the PTO needed a “toolbox of new
or fortified proceedings in which it may weed out low quality
patents.” 14
To accomplish this goal, Congress created a set of new
administrative review procedures housed in the PTO. 15 These
procedures, often collectively referred to as “post-issuance
proceedings,” ostensibly allow the PTO to correct its own
mistakes in issuing a patent in the first place. 16 In creating these
10. See Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls,
Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 688 (2012) (noting that the AIA
wanted to stop patent trolls and change some of the rules for joinder).
11. See id. (discussing how patent trolls are commonly criticized as
reducing American innovation); Jared A. Smith & Nicholas R. Transier, Trolling
for an NPE Solution, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 215, 222 (2015) (noting that
the Executive Branch has worked to stop patent trolls).
12. See Bryant, supra note 10, at 694 (describing the elements of the AIA);
Aria Soroudi, Defeating Trolls: The Impact of Octane and Highmark on Patent
Trolls, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 319, 323 (2015) (describing how these “patent
trolls” acquire the patents that they use to “blackmail” other companies). For a
discussion on how “patent trolls” can supposedly “blackmail” their targets, see
generally Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking,
and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1588 (2009).
13. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S7413 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2011) (statement of
Sen. Kyl) (arguing that the AIA is needed to get rid of the “worst patents, which
probably never should have been issued”).
14. Tran, supra note 5, at 498–99.
15. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–329 (2012) (outlining the requirements for
reviewing patent applications); Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at
913–23 (describing the procedures).
16. See Note, Recasting the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Role in
the Patent System, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2337, 2342 (2013) (“The AIA overhaul was
expressly designed to address the endemic problem of low patent quality
outlined in the introduction to this Note by better empowering the PTO as a
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new mechanisms, Congress insisted on speed by providing a
specific deadline for completion of each post-issuance
proceeding 17 but left all other details of design and
implementation to the PTO. 18
The procedures adopted by the PTO—in conjunction with the
congressional abrogation of the “clear and convincing” standard
for declaring a patent invalid in the context of post-issuance
proceedings 19—have had a serious effect on the value of patents
to their owners, and for good reason. 20 The economic value of a
patent must take into account the chance that the patent itself
will be declared invalid during litigation. 21 That chance is almost
never zero, even with respect to the “strongest,” most innovative

forum for invalidating bad patents.”).
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (requiring the director to issue all final
determinations within one year, except when the director extends the period by
six months for good cause); id. § 326(a)(11) (laying out the same timeline
requirements for post-grant review); Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011) (describing the mechanisms for
the various proceedings); Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 909
(describing the limitations of these proceedings). The America Invents Act
required CMBR to be conducted under the same rules as PGR. Thus, all
citations to the rules governing the conduct of PGR apply with equal force to
CBMR. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. at 330
(requiring that CMBR “be regarded as, and shall employ the standards and
procedures of, a post-grant review”). To avoid unnecessary prolixity, whenever
there are no differences between PGR and CBMR, we cite to the relevant
provision governing the conduct of PGR.
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (requiring the Director of the PTO to prescribe
regulations for the conduct of the IPR); id. § 326(a) (requiring the same for the
conduct of PGR and CBMR).
19. See id. § 316(e) (establishing a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard for declaring a patent invalid in IPR); id. § 326(e) (requiring the same
for PGR and CBMR).
20. See Brief for 3M Co. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Cuozzo Speed
Technologies LLC’s Petition for Rehearing en banc, In re Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC, 793 F.3d 1297, 1304 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 29, 2015) (noting that the court’s
decision goes against “sound patent policy”); Jennifer L. Case, How the America
Invents Act Hurts American Inventors and Weakens Incentives to Innovate, 82
UMKC L. REV. 29, 67 (2013) (explaining how innovation is stifled when
inventors have low confidence in acts like the AIA).
21. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley,
Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1719, 1761 (2003) (discussing how settlement negotiations can be hampered).
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and thoroughly examined patents. 22 The higher the chance that
the patent is invalid, the lower the value of the patent to the
patentee, 23 and the lower the price he will obtain in any licensing
or sale of that patent. 24 Consequently, making a patent easier to
invalidate necessarily reduces the value of that patent. 25 This
would not present a problem if the rule change were prospective
only, meaning if the lower standard applied only to patents
issued after the effective date of the AIA. 26 Though the wisdom of
making issued patents easier to invalidate can be debated, 27 a
prospective rule change would allow the inventors, investors,
patent applicants, and patentees to adjust their behavior and
investment decisions based on the known projected return on
their investment. 28 Yet, when the rules are changed retroactively,
such as when already issued patents are subject to new
legislative and administrative rules that could not have been
anticipated at the time the patent was issued, the patentees lose
that which makes their patents actually valuable. 29 As we
22. See Barry C. Harris et al., Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story,
28 ANTITRUST 83, 88 n.25 (2014) (noting how brand name drug companies have
an incentive to settle with generic drug companies instead of litigating patents).
Cf. Maureen A. O’Rourke & Joseph F. Brodley, An Incentives Approach to Patent
Settlements: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1767, 1779 (2003) (discussing the option of awarding attorney’s fees to attorneys
who bring successful patent claims).
23. See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1761 (remarking
that a patent is only the right to “try” to exclude, often with low odds of success).
24. See Harold See & Frank M. Caprio, The Trouble with Brulotte: The
Patent Royalty Term and Patent Monopoly Extension, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 813,
842–43 (1990) (discussing cases where low valuations of patents were made).
25. See id. at 843 (“The monopoly power of a patent, and therefore its
value, is not absolute.”).
26. See Benjamin K. Guthrie, Beyond Investment Protection: An
Examination of the Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule
of Law, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1151, 1185 (2013) (noting that “prospective
rules [allow] persons [to] plan their behavior”).
27. Cf. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the pros and cons of patent
protection).
28. See Guthrie, supra note 26, at 1185 (noting that “prospective rules
[allow] persons [to] plan their behavior”).
29. See generally Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 516 (1986) (“[I]nvestment decisions must be
based—at least implicitly—on some assumptions concerning what [legal] rules
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demonstrate in this Article, these retroactive changes present a
serious constitutional problem.
Part II describes the history of patent reform leading up to
and including the AIA. Part III explains how patent claim
construction proceeded in the court system before the PTO. In
Part IV, we discuss the history of takings jurisprudence from the
early days to recent Supreme Court pronouncements on the
subject. Part V applies that doctrine to the context of
post-issuance review of patents granted before enactment of the
AIA and shows that these types of patents have suffered an
unconstitutional taking without just compensation. Part VI
concludes.
II. The History of Patent Reform
A. The Creation of a “Claim”
The American patent system boasts a long history. The first
Patent Act was passed by the very first Congress, a mere year
after the Constitution was ratified. 30 Though the patent system
has undergone many changes over the last two plus centuries, the
first Patent Act had a number of provisions that are similar to
the current statute.
When it was initially created, the system involved
rudimentary examination of an application for a patent. 31 The
first Patent Act also created a progenitor of the modern
reexamination process. 32 Under the provisions of the 1790 Act,
and policies will be. To the extent that future government action departs from
these expectations, the value of investments will be affected.”).
30. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
31. See Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice &
Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 143, 150–51 (2011) (discussing the early examination system);
Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty & the Hotchkiss Standard, 20 FED. CIR. B.J.
219, 228 (2010) (describing the process for receiving a patent under the 1790
Act, including the “substantial and important” standard).
32. See Walterscheid, supra note 31, at 230–32 (explaining how the boards
established by the 1790 Act led to an early version of the reexamination process
as the boards tried to determine whether to grant patents or not).
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within one year of a patent’s issuance, any person could file a suit
in a district court seeking cancellation of a patent. 33 Provided
that a sufficient initial showing was made, the burden would shift
to the patentee to prove that the patent was properly issued. 34
Failure to do so resulted in cancellation of the patent. 35 Thus, in
some sense, for the first year post-issuance, the patent was
provisional.
The 1790 Act was relatively short-lived. Given that it
required three out of five Cabinet officials to spend their time
examining patents rather than attending to their other, more
direct duties, it is unsurprising that pressure was soon brought to
bear to switch to a different system. 36 Congress readily obliged,
but in doing so, it abolished patent examination altogether. 37
Instead, under the new system, the applicant simply swore an
oath that he was a true inventor of whatever he described in his
application and paid a fee to have the patent issued. 38 The 1793
Act also expanded the cancellation practice by extending the time
to seek such cancellation from one year to three years. 39 The Act
also did away with the presumption of validity. 40 Nonetheless,
the patentees who obtained their rights under the earlier regime
kept them even in the face of that Act’s repeal. 41
As could be surmised, patents granted without any
substantive examination were quite often of rather dubious
33. Patent Act of 1790, § 5.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Morriss & Nard, supra note 31, at 150–51 (noting that the
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson was particularly opposed to the act).
37. See id. (explaining how the 1793 Act shifted the gatekeeper and
examination role in patent applications to the courts). See generally Patent Act
of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (repealed 1836).
38. Patent Act of 1793, §§ 1, 11.
39. Id. § 10.
40. Compare Patent Act of 1790, § 6 (making issued patents prima facie
evidence of the exclusive rights by the patentee), with Patent Act of 1793, § 6
(lacking a similar provision). See also 6 MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 17:11 (4th
ed. 2015).
41. See Patent Act of 1794, 1 Stat. 393 (1794) (allowing cases that courts
had dismissed when the 1793 Act was repealed to be brought back into court for
at least one year).
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validity. 42 Additionally, the system was ripe for abuse by
unscrupulous claimants. Things got so bad that in 1809, William
Thornton, who then served as Superintendent of Patents, wrote
that “many of the patents are useless, except to give work to the
lawyers, & others so useless in construction as to be . . . merely
intended for sale.” 43 A few years later, he went so far as to declare
that a patent issued under his own authority was a fraud on the
public. 44 The Legislative and Judicial Branches were of the same
view, with a Senate committee concluding that “[a] considerable
portion of all the patents granted are worthless and void,” 45 while
a federal judge complained that “[t]he most frivolous and useless
alterations in articles in common use are denominated
improvements, and made pretexts for increasing their prices,
while all complaint and remonstrance are effectually resisted by
an exhibition of the great seal.” 46
Faced with this torrent of criticism, 47 Congress decided to
abandon the registration system of patents and require the
applicant to prove an entitlement to a patent before such would
issue to him. 48 To that end, Congress enacted the Patent Act of
1836, which returned the country to the system of pre-issuance
patent examination. 49 The 1836 Act formally established the
42. See Moriss & Nard, supra note 31, at 150 (noting that the Act lasted
only from 1790 to 1793).
43. Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early
Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 888 (1998) (quoting Letter
from William Thornton to Amos Eaton (May 5, 1809)).
44. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Winged Gudgeon—an Early Patent
Controversy, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 533, 533 (1997) (describing how
Thornton was sued for libel because he said that a patent he had issued was
fraudulent).
45. SENATE REPORT ACCOMPANYING BILL NO. 239, 24TH CONG., 1ST SESS.
(Apr. 28, 1836), http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Senate_Report_
for_Bill_No_293.pdf.
46. Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1041 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826).
47. See generally John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System:
Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1126–29 (2000) (highlighting general dissatisfaction with
the pre-1836 patent system and calls for reform).
48. Walterscheid, supra note 43, at 888 (offering the example of a
blacksmith who capitalized on this confusion).
49. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1870).
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Patent Office 50 and required an examination 51 to ensure that
what the applicant claimed
had [not] been invented or discovered by any other person in
this country prior to the alleged invention or discovery thereof
by the applicant, or that it had [not] been patented or
described in any printed publication in this or any foreign
country, or had [not] been in public use or on sale. 52

If these conditions were not met, no patent would issue. 53
The applicant, however, could amend his application by “altering
his specification to embrace only that part of the invention or
discovery which is new.” 54 Thus, the applicant engaged in a
“negotiation” with the Patent Office over the proper scope, if any,
of his exclusive rights.
To permit the Patent Office to conduct a rigorous
examination of patent applications, Congress needed to give the
Office something specific it could examine. Thus, the formal
requirement of the patent claim arose. Although it is true that it
became more common to add a “statement of claim” to patent
applications as the nineteenth century progressed, 55 the 1836 Act
for the first time required that the patent applicant “particularly
specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination,
which he claims as his own invention or discovery.” 56 It is by this
claim that the applicant’s entitlement to and the eventual scope
of exclusive rights would be measured. 57 The claiming method,
50. Id. § 1.
51. Id. § 2.
52. Id. § 7.
53. Id.
54. Id. The applicant was also permitted to persist in his application
without any amendments, in which case his claim would be heard by an
independent board composed of persons knowledgeable in the relevant art. Id.
This procedure is very similar to the present-day appeals of examiners’
rejections to the PTAB.
55. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of
Equivalents and Claiming the Future, Part 1 (1790–1870), 87 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y
371, 384 (2005) (describing how applicants began inserting boilerplate language
in patents to narrow the patent’s scope and avoid intruding on other patents).
56. Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 § 6 (1836).
57. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908)
(“The invention, of course, must be described and the mode of putting it to
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however, left much to be desired. Though claims were present in
every patent application, they were often nothing more than “a
catalog of selected elements without explanation of how they
interacted, merely followed by words such as ‘constructed and
adapted to operate substantially as set forth.’” 58 Needless to say,
this sort of claim did not help the courts fix the boundaries of the
exclusive rights claimed by the patentees. 59
The problem stemmed from the way that inventors wrote
their claims. The claims were written in what is now known as
“central claiming” form where the applicant “describe[s] or
point[s] to representative embodiments of the inventive idea.” 60
The claim would then encompass a variety of the “satellite”
creations of that idea. 61 Under the 1836 Act, patent practice
centered on the “drafting of a narrow claim setting forth a typical
embodiment coupled with broad interpretation by the courts to
include all equivalent constructions.” 62 While affording some
flexibility, this approach presented an obvious problem. The scope
of the patent grant was necessarily uncertain because no one
really knew how far from the “heart of the invention” one must be
to avoid liability for infringement—or, for that matter, what the
“heart of the invention” really was. 63
practical use, but the claims measure the invention. They may be explained and
illustrated by the description. They cannot be enlarged by it.”).
58. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
719, 732–33 (2009) (quoting Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,
62 F.3d 1512, 1564 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting)).
59. See id. at 732–34 (describing how the limits of patents were difficult to
discern for anyone because of the lack of examination).
60. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their
“Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 348–49 (2008).
61. See generally Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853) (upholding an
infringement claim even though the accused product did not fall within the
literal scope of the patent); Fromer, supra note 58, at 733 (discussing how the
courts dealt with central claiming).
62. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nies, J., dissenting), rev’d in part on other grounds,
520 U.S. 17 (1997).
63. See Emily Michiko Morris, Res or Rules? Patents and the (Uncertain)
Rules of the Game, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 481, 533 (2012)
(“Applying rules as if they were optimal manages to be both under- and overinclusive.”); Fromer, supra note 58, at 769 (noting the uncertainty attendant to
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These shortcomings ultimately led Congress to enact the
Patent Act of 1870. 64 This law was in many ways similar to the
1836 Act but contained one major change when it came to patent
claims. The scope of the change is particularly noteworthy given
that the difference in language was quite subtle. Whereas the
1836 Act required the applicant to “particularly specify and point
out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his
own invention or discovery,” 65 the 1870 Act forced the applicant
to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the part,
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention.” 66
This seemingly minor change had a profound impact on the
development of patent law. 67 From that point on, the applicant’s
exclusive rights would be delimited by the claim language. 68 The
claims would also serve the notice function by advising the public
where the applicant’s rights end and the public rights begin. 69
This system, in contrast to the one that existed under the 1836
Act, is known as “peripheral claiming.” 70 Whereas in the central
claiming system the patentee claims the “heart of the invention”
and then potentially sweeps within the orbit of exclusive rights
similar products, 71 in the peripheral claiming system the
applicant
central claiming).
64. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1871) (repealed 1952).
65. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 § 6 (1836) (emphasis added).
66. Patent Act of 1870, § 26.
67. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1566 (Nies, J., dissenting) (“The amendment of
the patent statute by the Act of 1870, while a small language change, was
interpreted to effect a major change from central to peripheral claiming.”).
68. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (“This distinct and
formal claim is, therefore, of primary importance, in the effort to ascertain
precisely what it is that is patented . . . to the appellant in this case.”). But see
Golden, supra note 60, at 351–52 (arguing that the evolution of claims’
importance has been a slow, decades-long process, rather than a discrete event
occasioned by the 1870 Act).
69. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90
B.U. L. REV. 51, 67 n.67 (2010) (explaining how the term “claim” was brought to
prominence in patent challenges).
70. See JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 54 (2d ed.
2006) (“Peripheral claiming means that the claim recites a precise boundary or
periphery of the patentee’s property right . . . .”).
71. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts?

732

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719 (2016)
stakes out the boundaries within which the patentee holds his
monopoly. The general description of the invention which
makes up the bulk of the patent is thus considerably less
important in the context of patent infringement. In the
peripheral claiming system it is therefore possible for a
product to be virtually identical to an invention described in a
patent, yet the claimed invention is not infringed. 72

In creating this new system, Congress hoped both to equip the
Patent Office with tools to separate meritorious applications from
the undeserving ones and “to improve the quality of the patents
by circumscribing the patentee’s ability to enforce overly vague
patents against the unsuspecting public.” 73
B. The Evolving (Re)Examination System
Once the PTO became charged with evaluating patent
applications prior to granting, it had to create a method to
separate applications directed to legitimate inventions from those
that were concerned with frivolous or non-novel things. 74 Given
the importance of this step to obtaining patents, much of the
reform efforts over the past century and a half have focused on
the patent application examination procedures. 75
On one hand, an inventor must write his claims in such a
way as to “particularly [point] out and distinctly [claim] the

Rethinking Patent Claim Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746 (2009)
(explaining how the 1870 Patent Acts encouraged a central claiming approach).
72. Werner Stemer, The Doctrine of Equivalents After Hilton Davis and
Markman, and a Proposal for Further Clarification, 22 NOVA L. REV. 783, 789
(1998).
73. Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 889.
74. See Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent
Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 42 (2011) (discussing the origination of centralized
regulatory patent challenges).
75. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 886–95 (giving an
overview of post-grant procedures); Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent
Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 78 (2014)
(“Whatever the means, these reforms share a common and urgent goal: making
the examination process more effective at identifying and rejecting low-quality
patent applications.”).
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subject matter [that he] regards as his invention.” 76 On the other
hand, as Judge Richard Linn of the Federal Circuit observed,
[A] claim is a linguistic description of a mental concept. Due to
the inherent limitations of language, the fit between the
description and the concept is almost always inexact. In
addition to the inexact fit caused by the inherent limitations of
language, the language itself may not be adequately developed
at the early stages when patent applications typically are filed,
particularly in rapidly evolving research fields. 77

The efforts to improve the PTO evaluation of the claim language
have been mostly of two varieties. One focused on the personnel
and another on the process of quality control. 78 Over the years,
the PTO has grown in both the number and the sophistication of
people it employs (perhaps little differently from any other
government agency). 79 While the personnel reforms attempted to
address problems through the “all hands on deck” approach, 80 the
procedural reforms—and proposed reforms—focused on the
ability of the PTO to catch its own mistakes via a “second look” at
patents or patent applications. 81
As early as 1918, an observer of a patent system argued that
the then-existing patent system resulted in patents being granted
for things “not invented,” “not new,” and “not useful,” all causing
“unsettled, unsafe and unsound business conditions.” 82 To
76. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
77. Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 621–22
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also French
v. Rogers, 9 F. Cas. 790, 792 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (noting that “as inventors are
rarely experts either in philology or law, it has long been established as a rule,
that their writings are to be scanned with a good degree of charity”).
78. See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2158–62 (2009) (listing the administrative changes aimed at
achieving these goals).
79. See John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents and Patent Law’s “Cost
Disease,” 51 HOUS. L. REV. 455, 486–87 (2013) (explaining how the PTO tries to
use an increase in personnel to solve patent problems).
80. See id. (detailing the exponential increase in the number of patent
employees, growing “nearly one-hundred fold” from 1836 to 2012).
81. See generally Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 886–923;
Wagner, supra note 78, at 2158–62.
82. James H. Lightfoot, A Proposed Department of Invention and Discovery,
1 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 116, 118–19 (1918).
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address this problem, he proposed creating a “Bureau of Validity
Examinations” that would be staffed with “re-examiners to reexamine claims held allowable by other assistant examiners.” 83 In
his view, this additional procedure would “afford inventors full
protection and be essentially valid, thus constituting a safe and
sound basis for the establishment of industries and safe and
secure investments for the capitalists who may promote the
establishment thereof.” 84 This early “second look” proposal
focused on early stage re-examination (perhaps even pre-formal
patent issuance), 85 so that an issued patent would “provide for
the grant of unconditional, secure and exclusive rights.” 86 Though
not heeded, the idea did not entirely disappear, either. In 1943,
this thought reappeared in a Report of the National Patent
Planning Commission, which suggested an administrative claim
revocation procedure in lieu of litigation. 87 The recommendation,
however, suggested that these procedures be limited to the first
six months of patent life—and was altogether silent on whether
to apply the proposed procedure to patents that have already
issued. 88
The drumbeat of complaints about “poor quality” patents
that make it through the porous sieve of the PTO continued even
after Congress enacted the far-reaching reforms in the 1952
Patent Act. 89 Although for the first time the Act clearly
delineated the separate requirements for patentability 90 and
instituted a number of other improvements to the system, 91
83. Id. at 127.
84. Id.
85. Id. (proposing that the Bureau “[re-]examine the subject-matter of each
application . . . so that when granted patents may afford inventors full
protection. . . .” (emphasis added)).
86. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
87. Report of the Nat’l Patent Planning Comm., 78th Cong. (1943), 25 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 455, 460 (1943).
88. See id. at 460–61 (noting the difficulty of evaluating all the facts when
determining whether to grant a patent).
89. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 891–93 (detailing
some of the complaints regarding the 1952 Patent Acts reforms).
90. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012) (listing the statutory
requirements for sufficient evidence).
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within about a dozen years, complaints of lax PTO procedures
and multitudes of erroneously issued patents reared their head
again. 92
Following the recommendations of the Presidential
Commission on the Patent System, 93 Congress made several
attempts to create procedures that would address the “lax”
standards of the Patent Office that supposedly resulted in “low
quality” patents, 94 but the first reexamination procedure was not
enacted until 1980. 95 Under most of these proposals, patents
would be subject to reconsideration at the PTO, but just for a
limited time, and after the expiration of that period could only be
attacked in court. 96 The proposals were also consistent with the
European practice of patent opposition, as was noted by Judge
Giles S. Rich, one of the key authors of the Patent Act of 1952 and
a preeminent authority on patent law: “Oppositions shortly after
patent rights come into being (between five months and one year
in the British ‘belated opposition’) are favored.” 97 Indeed, Edward
F. McKie, Jr., a premier patent litigator who went on to argue—
and win—the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 98
explicitly cautioned against patent reexaminations unrestricted
91. See L. James Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent
of the Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 659–60 (1955) (“They
boldly planned and carried out comprehensive programs of study and discussion
of the patent statutes . . . .”).
92. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 891–93 (detailing
some of the complaints regarding the 1952 Patent Act reforms).
93. REP. OF THE PRES. COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS., S. DOC. NO. 90-5 (1st
Sess. 1967).
94. See generally H.R. 14632, 94th Cong. (1976); S. 473, 94th Cong. (1975);
S. 2930, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 1321, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 4259, 93d Cong. (1974);
S. 4259, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 2930, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 2504, 93d Cong. (1973);
S. 1321, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 643, 92d Cong. (1971); S. 1569, 91st Cong. (1969);
S. 1246, 91st Cong. (1969); H.R. 12880, 91st Cong. (1969); S. 1042, 90th Cong.
(1967); S. 1691, 90th Cong. (1967); S. 2597, 90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th
Cong. (1967).
95. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 30, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
96. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 893–94 (explaining
this process for challenging patents).
97. Giles S. Rich, Forward—and Comments on Post-Issuance
Reexamination, 4 AM. PAT. L. ASS’N Q.J. 86, 87–88 (1976).
98. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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by time but endorsed a proposal that would have allowed public
opposition and reexamination proceedings within a year of a
patent’s allowance. 99
Yet, despite these warnings, the reexamination procedure
created as part of the Bayh–Dole Act was significantly more
far-reaching than the early proposals. First, it was made to apply
to all patents whether issued before or after the effective day of
the Act. 100 Second, there were no time limits to requesting the
reexamination. 101 Nonetheless, the reexamination procedure was
limited only to questions of novelty and obviousness. 102 Other
questions of invalidity such as lack of enablement, failure of
written description, inequitable conduct, etc., were beyond the
scope of the procedure. 103
The reexamination procedure established by the Bayh–Dole
Act starts when any party—including the patentee himself—files
a petition with the PTO that argues, by citing to prior art, that
the patent fails to clear either the novelty bar of § 102 or the
obviousness bar of § 103—or both. 104 If the PTO is convinced that
there exists a “substantial new question of patentability,” a
reexamination shall be ordered. 105 Once ordered, the
reexamination proceeds just like the original examination of a
patent application would, with only the applicant and the Patent
Office involved. 106 The requester—unless it is the patentee
99. Edward F. McKie, Jr., Proposals for an American Patent Opposition
System in the Light of the History of Foreign Systems, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 94,
101 (1974).
100. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
amended by, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Congress, without apparent
objection, applied the legislation to all unexpired patents.”).
101. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 302, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015 (1980) (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 302 (2012)) (“Any person at any time may file a request for
reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art
cited . . . .”) (emphasis added).
102. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
103. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent Invalidity Signals, 24
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 327 (2011) (noting that at trial a patent could be
attacked on all of these grounds); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.906(c) (excluding these
types of claims from an administrative adjudication).
104. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–302.
105. Id. § 304.
106. Id. § 305 (“[R]eexamination will be conducted according to the
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himself—is not a party to these further proceedings—hence the
name ex parte reexamination. 107 In these proceedings, the PTO
considers the claims subject to review as if these claims were
never granted in the first place. 108 The applicant, in turn, can also
take advantage of this posture and seek amendment of his claims
to avoid any finding of invalidity. 109 Ex parte reexamination was
promoted as a means for “efficient resolution of questions about
the validity of issued patents without recourse to expensive and
lengthy infringement litigation.” 110
These confident predictions quickly gave rise to
disappointment and complaints that the reexamination system is
not living up to its goals of “clearing the field” of invalid
patents. 111 One of the causes of this failure was believed to be the
inability of the initial reexamination requesters to argue their
case to the PTO. 112
In 1990, then-Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher
created an Advisory Commission on Patent Reform that in 1992
produced a comprehensive report recommending a number of
changes in the patent system. 113 One of the recommendations was
“providing third parties with more opportunities for substantive

procedures established for initial examination.”).
107. 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) (2014).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 305; 37 C.F.R. § 1.550.
109. See In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing
how a claimant can make adjustments to claims if necessary in a PTO
proceeding, but cannot do so in the district court proceeding); Rules of Practice
in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111, 1.550 (2014) (detailing the process for
making adjustments to claims in a PTO proceeding).
110. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3–4 (1980).
111. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo, Reexamination—To What Avail? An
Overview, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 616 (1981) (recommending changes in
reexamination procedure); Lawrence A. Stahl & Donald H. Heckenberg, Jr., The
Changing Attitudes Toward Inter Partes Reexamination 1 (June 9, 2010),
http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/attachment622.pdf
(expressing frustration with inter partes patent resolution).
112. See Stahl & Heckenberg, supra note 111, at 1 (explaining why parties
avoid ex parte reexaminations).
113. See generally ADVISORY COMM. ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO
THE
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE (Aug. 1992), http://ipmall.info/hosted_
resources/lipa/patents/patentact/ACPLR-l.pdf.
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participation during the reexamination proceedings.” 114 It took
another few years, but eventually Congress responded to the
perceived problems of ex parte reexamination and in 1999 created
an additional reexamination process that allowed for the
participation of the third party in the process. 115 If ordered, the
inter partes reexamination, much like ex parte reexamination,
was conducted according to the same procedures as the initial
examination, except with the opportunity for the requester to file
responses to any filings by the patentee. 116 Unlike ex parte
reexamination, however, the inter partes process was only
applicable to patents that were applied for on or after the
effective date of the act creating the procedure. 117 Thus, any preexisting patents did not face the prospect of this quasi-litigation
at the PTO. 118
Inter partes reexamination was met with even less success
than its ex parte cousin. 119 Indeed, some attorneys have gone so
far as to say that “it would be legal malpractice to recommend a
client initiate an inter partes reexamination.” 120 Because of this
perceived failure in the process, Congress began to yet again look
for ways to improve the quality of patents by giving the Patent
Office additional tools to weed out patents that should not have
been issued. That led to the eventual passage of the America
Invents Act and a host of new “second look” proceedings.
114. Id. at 14.
115. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501 (codified in relevant part in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2006)) (repealed
2012).
116. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.937 (2014). We use the past tense
because the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act abolished inter partes
reexamination. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–313 (2011).
117. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.913 (2014) (implementing Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4608
(1999)).
118. Id.
119. See Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55
B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1472 (2014) (noting how the PTO procedures, while less
expensive, are not a good alternative for litigation).
120. Sherry M. Knowles, Thomas E. Vanderbloemen & Charles E. Peeler,
Inter Partes Patent Reexamination in the United States, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 611, 614 (2004) (quoting 147 Cong. Rec. H5360 (Sept. 5, 2001)
(remarks of Rep. Berman)).
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C. The Post-Issuance Proceedings Under the America Invents Act
The AIA was Congress’s latest—though apparently not
to “fix” the patent system by reducing the
number of “low-quality” patents in circulation. To do that,
Congress created several new mechanisms for post-issuance
review. In creating these new mechanisms, Congress attempted
to fix the shortcomings of the old reexamination systems. 122 The
procedures that emerged were therefore, unsurprisingly, quite
different from what came before. The AIA created three distinct
post-issuance review proceedings, each with its own unique
applicability. 123 The three new mechanisms created by the AIA
are (1) Post Grant Review; 124 (2) Inter Partes Review; 125 and
(3) Covered Business Method Review. 126 This Article will discuss
each of the procedures in turn, though it will focus mostly on the
latter two for reasons that will become obvious shortly.
last 121—attempt

121. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015);
Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act, S. 1137,
114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Innovation Protection Act, H.R. 1832, 114th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2015); Demand Letter Transparency Act, H.R. 1896, 114th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2015); Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act, H.R. 2045, 114th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s
Growth (STRONG) Patents Act, S. 632, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Innovation
Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Transparency and
Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Litigation
Integrity Act, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); STOP Act, H.R. 2766, 113th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Litigation and Innovation Act, H.R. 2639, 113th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2013); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (1st Sess.
2013); Patent Quality Improvement Act, S. 866, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013);
SHIELD Act, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
122. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 913 (describing how
Congress continues to create ineffective post-issuance review mechanisms).
123. For a detailed discussion of the mechanics of these proceedings see id.
at 914–23.
124. 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 (2012).
125. Id. §§ 311–319.
126. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat.
284, 329–31 (2011).
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1. Post-Grant Review

The Post-Grant Review (PGR) process actually resembles the
original, mid-twentieth century proposals for reexamination. 127 It
is also similar to the opposition practice in the European Patent
Office, 128 and indeed was enacted with an eye towards making
the U.S. patent issuance process similar to the European one. 129
PGR, however, is not of particular relevance to the focus of this
Article because Congress was quite careful in crafting this
provision. Much like the now-defunct inter partes reexamination,
PGR was made applicable only to applications filed after the
effective date of the Act. 130 Although it is not clear that PGRs will
actually improve the patent system, 131 this mechanism creates no
problem similar to the one presented by the other two AIAcreated post-issuance proceedings. 132 Because PGR is applicable
only to patents issued after the effective date of the Act, future
inventors could take PGR into account when drafting their
applications, but past inventors were not similarly blessed when
it comes to the remaining mechanisms.
2. Inter Partes Review and Covered Business Method Review
Inter Partes Review (IPR) supplanted the abolished inter
partes reexamination, 133 though it kept some of its features. Any
127. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text (discussing how the
reexamination process was created and how it changed over time).
128. See generally Opposition Procedure in the EPO, OFFICIAL J. EPO 148
(Mar. 2001), http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj001/03_01/03_ 1481.pdf.
129. See Filip De Corte et al., AIA Post-Grant Review & European
Oppositions: Will They Work in Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the
Night?, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 93, 96 (2012) (describing the third-party options
available for cancellation).
130. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, § 134(m)(A), 125 Stat. at 330
(explaining that the goal of the act was to harmonize the U.S. patent system
with those of entities such as the European Union, Japan, Canada, and
Australia).
131. See generally Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3.
132. See infra Parts III.C–D and Part V (noting how post-issuance
proceedings can lead to issues with the Takings Clause).
133. See Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
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person other than a patent owner can file an IPR request
challenging an issued patent on the grounds that it is not novel or
is obvious in light of prior art. 134 The challenger must identify the
patent claims he believes to be improperly issued and submit
documents that would support his allegations. 135 If the PTO
grants the petition and institutes the IPR proceedings, 136 the
matter goes to trial before the Patent Trials and Appeals Board
(PTAB), which then renders the final decision on the validity of
the claims. 137
Covered Business Method Review (CBMR) is in many ways
similar to IPR but has, on the one hand, additional limitations on
which patents are eligible for such review, while on the other
hand it gives challengers more potential grounds for invalidation
of CBMR-eligible patents. 138 Under the AIA, patents are subject
to CBMR only if they “claim[] a method or corresponding
apparatus for performing data processing or other operations
used in the practice, administration, or management of a
financial product or service, except that the term does not include
patents for technological inventions.” 139
The trial phase of IPR and CBMR is in some ways similar to
a traditional trial in the courts of record, though perhaps a bit
more abbreviated and streamlined. 140 For example, discovery in
the form of expert reports, cross-examination of expert witnesses,
productions of documents or things inconsistent with a party’s
(quoting H.R.Rep. No. 112–98, pt. 1, at 46–47 (2011)).
134. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012).
135. Id. § 312(a)(3).
136. Id. § 314.
137. Id. §§ 316(c), 318.
138. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1),
125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011) (requiring that CBMR be conducted under the same
rules as PGR); 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (establishing broad grounds for PGR review).
In contrast, IPR is only available for petitions challenging a patent’s novelty or
non-obviousness. Id. § 311(b).
139. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. at 331. One
final difference between IPR and CBMR is that the latter is a “transitional”
program and will expire eight years after first becoming available on September
16, 2020. Id. § 18(a)(3), 125 Stat. at 330.
140. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 916 (describing the
similarities and differences between federal and PGR trials).
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asserted position, and the like is permitted, 141 though of course it
has to be accomplished rather quickly given the twelve-month
deadline for the PTAB to render its final judgment. 142
The key differences between a trial before the PTAB and
before an Article III judge lie in two features unique to the PTO
procedures. First, the patent challenger bears a lower burden of
proof before the PTAB than he does at the district court. 143
Whereas in the district courts patents can only be invalidated
upon the showing of “clear and convincing evidence,” 144 in the
PTO proceedings, the petitioner carries his burden by satisfying
the “preponderance of evidence” standard. 145 Second, and
particularly salient to the focus of this paper, is the difference in
how the Patent Office reviews the challenged claims. Whereas in
federal court, claims are construed by reference to what a person
having ordinary skill in the relevant art understands them to
mean, 146 at the Patent Office the claims are given their “broadest
reasonable construction.” 147 It is to the importance of this
distinction that we now turn.
III. Claim Construction and Meaning
“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a
patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the
right to exclude.’” 148 This understanding stems from the
141. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(5), 326(a)(5) (2012).
142. Id. §§ 316(a)(11).
143. Compare id. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (“[T]he petitioner shall have the burden of
proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”),
with Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that
under 35 U.S.C. § 282, a patent invalidity defense raised in litigation must be
proven by “clear and convincing evidence”). See also infra Parts III.B–C.
144. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. at 2242.
145. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e).
146. See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention
through whose eyes the claims are construed. Such person is deemed to read the
words used in the patent documents . . . and to have knowledge of any special
meaning and usage in the field.”).
147. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b) (2014).
148. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
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requirement that the patentee “particularly point out and
distinctly claim” his invention. 149 Thus, it is “the claims that
measure the invention,” 150 or as Judge Rich put it, “the name of
the game is the claim.” 151 At the same time, as the courts have
recognized, language is often an imperfect measure of the scope of
the invention, and “the fit between the description and the
concept is almost always inexact.” 152 As a result, to understand
what the inventor has claimed for herself and to delineate the
scope of the patentee’s right to exclude, the language of the claim
must be construed. 153 Similarly, to verify that the applicant has
actually invented something new and does not seek to exclude the
public from that which is already known, the claim must be
construed and then compared to the prior art. 154 Because both
infringement and validity analyses ride on the meaning of the
claim, claim construction is often the “end all and be all” of patent
examination and patent litigation. 155 Although one would think
(quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d
1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
149. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (“The act of Congress,
therefore, very wisely requires of the applicant a distinct and specific statement
of what he claims . . . . This distinct and formal claim is, therefore, of primary
importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented . . . .”).
150. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 11 (1935) (reiterating
that it is the claims of the patent, and not its specifications, that measure the
invention).
151. Giles Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of
Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497,
499 (1990).
152. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558,
621 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
153. See David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1073, 1078 (2010) (showing that claim construction is the first step one
must take in patent infringement analysis); see also Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (“[W]e have
held that a claim ‘must be construed before determining its validity, just as it is
first construed before deciding infringement.’”).
154. See Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron
Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2008) (discussing infringement analysis
and validity analysis).
155. Id.; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and
Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 72 (2005) (“This constructive
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that the same words of the claim would be given the same
construction at all stages of the process, in reality that is not the
case. The PTO construes claims differently from the federal
courts. 156 The different treatment might make sense at the
examination stage of the patent, but maintaining the difference
post-issuance undermines the exclusive right secured by the
patent and in so doing, at least in some cases presents a
constitutional problem.
A. Claim Construction During Patent Examination
The goal of patent examination is to ascertain the
“patentability of the invention as ‘the applicant regards’ it,” 157
and to measure it against the prior art. But as already stated,
language is inherently an ambiguous medium through which to
define almost anything, much less technical inventions. 158 The
examination then exists “to fashion claims that are precise, clear,
correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of
claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the
administrative process.” 159
An uninitiated person might think that a broad claim is
necessarily better than a narrow claim. After all, to analogize to
real property, claims on more land are likely more valuable than
claims on less land because one can exclude other individuals
from a broader swath of property. But patent law is different.
Although a broad claim does grant one an opportunity to exclude
specification embodies the full extent of the specification’s information about the
invention and is, accordingly, labeled the ‘disclosed invention.’”).
156. See supra notes 143–147 and accompanying text (showing the
differences in evidentiary standards when proving unpatentability in trials
before the PTAB and before Article III courts); see also infra Part III.A–C
(discussing claim construction and meaning as bedrock principles in patent
law).
157. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112
¶ 2 (2012)).
158. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 723 (2002) (“[P]atent claim language may not describe with complete
precision the range of an invention’s novelty.”).
159. Zletz, 3 F.2d at 322.
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others from a broader area of any given technology 160—and thus
charge higher prices to anyone who wishes to practice in the
area 161—there is a corollary maxim that makes broader claims
potentially highly problematic. Because patents can only be
granted for inventing new and non-obvious things, 162 a claim that
describes something that pre-dated the claimed invention cannot
be granted, 163 and, if granted in error, is invalid. 164 Thus, a broad
claim may well be useful to ensnare more putative infringers, 165
but it is also a trap for the unwary. A broad claim has a higher
chance of sweeping within its ambit things that pre-existed the
applicant’s invention. 166 Thus the rule: “That which infringes, if
160. See Orin S. Kerr, Computers and the Patent System: The Problem of the
Second Step, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 47, 53 (2002) (using the
example of computerized algorithms to show how obtaining a patent on a
machine that executes a certain function gives the inventor the right to exclude
others from running that algorithm on a computer for the duration of the
patent, creating broad patent protection); Jacob Mackler, Intellectual Property
Favoritism: Who Wins in the Globalized Economy, the Patent or the Trade
Secret?, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 263, 268–69 (2012) (“[A]
patentee with broad patent rights can exclude from the market a broad range of
‘functionally equivalent’ inventions.”).
161. See Richard S. Toikka, Patent Licensing Under Competitive and NonCompetitive Conditions, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 279, 287 (2000)
(noting that most commentators agree that a broad patent can command a
higher per unit royalty, which is confirmed by the inverse relationship of the
elasticity of demand and the ability of the patent to exclude substitutes).
162. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2012).
163. Id.; see also Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L.
REV. 431, 447 (2015) (“[A] patent technically may not issue if each of the claim
elements in a patent application is found in a single prior art reference.”).
164. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (noting that a defense to a patent
infringement claim is that the patent was invalid in the first place); Weldon E.
Havins, Immunizing the Medical Practitioner “Process” Infringer: Greasing the
Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 51, 57
(1999) (“If the patent has been issued and challenged, the court is required to
hold the patent invalid and inadvertently granted by the PTO.”).
165. See Yelderman, supra note 75, at 88–89 (showing that a broader claim
makes it more likely that an alleged infringer will be found to infringe the
patent, and the greater the number of potential infringers, the more difficult it
will be for those potential infringers to avoid or design around the claim).
166. See id. at 87–88 (remarking that broad claims make it difficult to prove
the validity of a claim due to the fact that it is impossible to conduct a search
exhaustive enough to conclusively prove the non-existence of potentially
invalidating prior art).
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later, would anticipate [and invalidate], if earlier.” 167 The point of
the examination, both for the PTO and the applicant, is to narrow
the claims to such parameters as not to encompass prior art
within its ambit. 168
To achieve those goals, the PTO pushes against the applicant
to see how far his claims extend, 169 much like judges push against
litigants in oral argument to see how far the logic of a given
proposition extends. 170 In response, applicants can disclaim
certain meanings or amend claims as they see fit. 171 This process
can continue through several rounds and last months or years as
the applicant and the PTO fine-tune the language of the
claims. 172 These disclaimers and amendments indicate what the
167. Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889).
168. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(c) (2012) (“[T]he applicant or patent owner must
clearly point out the patentable novelty which he or she thinks the claims
present . . . .”); Kristen Osenga, Cooperative Patent Prosecution: Viewing Patents
Through A Pragmatics Lens, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 115, 136 (2011) (explaining
that an inventor can overcome a rejection from PTO examiners either by
amending the claim to narrow or clarify its scope, or showing how the rejected
claim is different from prior art).
169. See In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“This
approach serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims,
finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified.”); Application of
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“[R]eading the claim in light of the
specification . . . .”). Cf. Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of consulting the prosecution history in construing a
claim is to ‘exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.’”
(quoting ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1988))).
170. See Daniel M. Friedman, Winning on Appeal, 9 LITIG. 15, 18 (1983)
(explaining that oral argument is an “occasion that the court can question
counsel, test his position to determine its strengths and weaknesses, and
determine the implications and consequences of the arguments”).
171. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (recounting how an
applicant can narrow or amend her claim if rejected by the PTO due to
questionable similarities to prior art).
172. See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently PostBilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1673, 1689–90 (2010) (recounting the long and arduous patent examination
process and the multiple rounds of examination involved, along with a lack of
any predictable pattern or linearity); Hana Oh Chen, Combating Baseless Patent
Suits: Rule 11 Sanctions with Technology-Specific Application, 54 JURIMETRICS
J. 135, 178 n.36 (2014) (describing the prevalence of frivolous patent lawsuits
and use of Rule 11 sanctions that attempt to combat frivolous suits by
encouraging parties to perform sufficient prefiling investigation).
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applicant regards as his invention and narrow the reach of the
claims to avoid capturing the prior art. 173 It therefore makes
perfect sense to interpret the claims as broadly as reasonable to
confine the applicant to that which he actually invented and to
make sure that the claims as issued are not invalid for reading on
prior art. Once the claims issue, however, all of the amendments,
disclaimers, and modifications become part of the patent
prosecution history and can be used to hold the patentee to the
scope of the claims as he presented them to the PTO. 174 At this
point, interpreting the claims as broadly as reasonable no longer
makes sense.
B. Claim Construction in Litigation
It is worth remembering that the PTO does not adjudge
infringement disputes (which can only arise after the patent
issues). 175 The concern of the PTO is to make sure that the
applied-for claims do not encompass or “read on” prior art. 176 A
practitioner in a relevant field, on the other hand, would want to
know whether his product is encompassed by the already issued
claims so as to take the necessary steps to avoid infringement. 177
173. See Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571 (“The PTO broadly interprets claims
during examination of a patent application since the applicant may ‘amend his
claims to obtain protection commensurate with his actual contribution to the
act.’”); Chimie, 402 F.3d at 1384 (relaying that, when patentees unequivocally
disavow certain meanings to obtain patents, the doctrine of prosecution
disclaimer attaches, which narrows the ordinary meaning of the claim).
174. See Festo Corp. v. Shokestu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 733 (2002) (“Prosecution history estoppel requires that the claims of a
patent be interpreted in light of the proceedings in the PTO during the
application process.”).
175. See Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275,
317 (2010) (stating that the PTO has never been delegated any authority over
issues of infringement).
176. See Franklin Pierce Law Center’s Eighth Intellectual Property System
Major Issues Conference, 47 IDEA 1, 37 (2006) (statement of Larry Pope) (“It
seems the critical function—the really valuable function—that we ask
examiners to do is to do the examination, to weigh prior art against the claimed
invention.”).
177. See Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts,
74 IND. L.J. 759, 799 n.153 (1999) (noting that claims must be “particular” and
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Thus, issued claims are construed by reference to their “ordinary
and customary meaning.” 178 What is “ordinary and customary” is
judged not by reference to the understanding of a member of the
general public, but by reference to the understanding of a person
having ordinary skill in the relevant art. 179 This approach makes
sense because patents are highly technical documents, which are
meant to satisfy “[c]ompetitors[’] need to know not only what is
protected by the claims, but also which aspects of the invention
have been disclosed, but not claimed, and are thus, considered to
have been dedicated to the public domain.” 180 The inquiry into the
meaning of the claims post-issuance is fundamentally different
from the inquiry during examination. 181 Although it is certainly
possible and appropriate to attack patent validity in litigation, 182
the fundamental role of an issued claim is to put the public on
notice as to what the patentee claims as his own property.
Professor Chris Cotropia explained:
The public notice function of patent claims now stands at the
‘forefront of patent law jurisprudence.’ Both the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit have emphasized the role the
patent claim plays in informing the public of the subject
matter a patent protects.

“distinct” so that the public has fair notice of the bounds of the claimed
invention); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (same).
178. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
179. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (“We have made clear, moreover, that the ordinary and customary
meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of
ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.”).
180. Crissa A. Seymour Cook, Constructive Criticism: Phillips v. AWH Corp.
and the Continuing Ambiguity of Patent Claim Construction Principles, 55 U.
KAN. L. REV. 225, 268 n.28 (2006).
181. Compare In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“This
approach serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims,
finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified.”), with Chimie v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Courts construe claim
terms in order to assign a fixed, unambiguous, legally operative meaning to the
claim.” (emphasis added)).
182. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012) (noting the different defenses that must
be pleaded in “any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent”).
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...
Patent claims perform another function; they actually
establish the scope of exclusivity afforded to an issued patent.
That is, patent claims define the invention the patent will
protect. This definitional function is tied to the claim's public
notice function. The substantive function of a patent claim,
however, goes well beyond the claim simply being locatable
and open to public inspection. The claim tells the public the
patent’s particular scope of exclusivity by defining the patent
grant’s metes and bounds. This is the most fundamental trait
of the modern patent claim. Through the claim’s words, the
patent claim establishes the primary area of exclusivity the
patentee will enjoy because of the patent grant. A claim
resembles a land description in a deed because it defines the
exact area protected by the legal instrument. 183

Patent applicants know the function of the claims and how the
courts construe the claims. They know for whom the claims are
being written and therefore “negotiate” the claim language with
the Patent Office with an understanding of the scope each claim
will be given. 184 They do so because “[t]he patent claim’s scope is
often dispositive for most patent issues. Once the subject matter
the patent claim identifies is defined, infringement and validity
questions usually are answered easily.” 185
It therefore matters a great deal how claims are construed.
The patentee wishes to avoid an overly broad claim construction
because that would greatly increase the chances of the claim
being found invalid. 186 In fact, if the patentee were led to believe
that his claims would be given a broader construction postissuance, he would likely amend the claims further to reduce the
possibility of the claims being found invalid. 187 At the end of the
183. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies
and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 64–65 (2005)
[hereinafter Cotropia, Claim Interpretation].
184. See Osenga, supra note 168, at 136–37 (setting up the interplay
between the inventor and the patent officer in terms of a negotiation, as the
“inventor serves up the initial offer, the examiner counters,” with the intent to
eventually reach a compromise).
185. Cotropia, Claim Interpretation, supra note 183, at 67.
186. See Yelderman, supra note 75, at 88–89 (“[T]he broader the claim, the
more likely that an alleged infringer will be found to infringe it . . . .”).
187. Cf. Palmaz’s European Patents, [1999] RPC 47, 59 (Patents Ct.) (UK)
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day “[t]he breadth of protection defines the patent's exclusionary
power and how it can affect the technological development in the
patent’s
given
industry.
The
scope
of
protection
also . . . establish[es] how different an invention must be from an
earlier accomplishment to warrant patent protection.” 188 In other
words, the breadth of the patent claim determines both the scope
and the very existence of the patentee’s exclusive rights. 189
It should also be noted that, while claims may be—and often
are—invalidated in litigation, 190 once issued they are presumed
valid. 191 This presumption is codified in the Patent Act 192 and has
been construed for over a century to mean that the claims will not
be invalidated except upon clear and convincing evidence of
invalidity. 193 This presumption accords a certain level of security
to the patentees and is often the most valuable part of the patent
grant. 194 Indeed, cases often rise and fall (once claims are
construed) on the presumption of validity. Thus, in Microsoft v.
(“The purpose of making an amendment to a patent is to avoid a finding of
invalidity.”).
188. Cotropia, Claim Interpretation, supra note 183, at 68.
189. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523,
550–51 (2010) [hereinafter Chiang, Patent Boundaries] (“A nominally narrowing
amendment to avoid prior art thus broadens the legal scope of the claim, and
increases its monopoly cost, because the amendment transforms legal scope
from zero to something greater.”).
190. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205–06 (1998) (reporting that
about 48% of all litigated claims are found to be invalid); see also Mark A.
Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J.
369, 420 (1994) (reporting an invalidity rate of about 44%); Robert P. Merges,
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 822 (1988) (same).
191. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131
S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (reiterating that a patent shall be presumed valid, and
the burden of proving invalidity rests on the party asserting that invalidity).
192. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a
patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other
claims . . . .”).
193. See i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (stating that the presumption of validity
cannot be “overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence”).
194. See Yelderman, supra note 75, at 97–102 (using an algorithm to
calculate the value of the presumption of validity and finding that the increase
in a claim’s expected value depends on both the improvement in the likelihood of
validity and the expected infringement value of the claim).
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i4i, 195 after the claims were construed, the question of validity
came down to whether Microsoft, which had made a solid
showing that the claims in question may well be invalid, made a
“clear and convincing” showing. 196 That requirement was the
difference between a $200 million award as well as a prohibition
on future infringing activities, 197 and a finding of no liability for
either past or future actions. The presumption of validity can
thus be a tremendously valuable asset.
In a one-two punch, however, the AIA created
post-issuance proceedings that construe the claims more broadly
than do court proceedings 198 and that do not apply the same
presumption of validity as courts. 199
C. Claim Construction in Post-Issuance Proceedings
The AIA’s post-issuance proceedings, as the name implies,
occur after the patent has issued. In other words, claims have
been “negotiated” with the PTO, narrowing amendments and
disclaimers have been made, and the patentee has created a
record on which a person of ordinary skill in the art can rely to
judge both the likelihood that his own activity is infringing and
the likelihood that the claims in question are invalid. 200
195. 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
196. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 846–48 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (recognizing that, while Microsoft put on a strong
case, it was not enough to carry the burden under the “clear and convincing”
standard of proof).
197. See id. at 839 (discussing the lower court’s jury verdict of $200 million
in damages to i4i as a result of the jury’s rejection of Microsoft’s argument that
the patent was invalid).
198. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.300(b) (2012) (giving a claim the broadest
reasonable construction in light of the “specification of the patent in which it
appears”); see also infra Part III.C (discussing claim construction in postissuance proceedings and how the AIA gave claims the broadest reasonable
meaning).
199. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (2012) (giving petitioners the burden of
proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence).
200. See supra Part III.A (expanding on claim construction during the
patent examination and the benefits and drawbacks to both broad and narrow
claims).
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Furthermore, the claims have acquired a presumption of
validity that is only rebuttable by clear and convincing
evidence. 201 Or at least all of this was true until the passage of
the America Invents Act.
When the AIA was enacted, the PTO had to create rules
that would govern the proceedings contemplated by the Act. 202
The Act itself left unresolved the question of which standard of
claim construction to apply. Instead, the PTO decided the issue
via rulemaking. 203 The PTO chose to apply the “broadest
reasonable construction” standard mostly on the strength of
history. 204 In adopting the rule, it provided no analysis of the
propriety of this construction in the new trial-type proceedings
at the PTO. Instead, it explained that such a practice is
consistent with what the PTO had been doing in ex parte and
inter partes reexamination “[f]or nearly thirty years.” 205 The
PTO noted that the “Federal Circuit has continued to require
the Office to give patent claims their broadest reasonable
construction consistent with the specification in patentability
determination proceedings.” 206 It further concluded that
adhering to this rule is “consistent” with the legislative history
of the AIA, 207 and therefore refused to adopt the “perspective of

201. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (restating the presumption of validity of a
patent claim, and putting the burden on the party asserting invalidity to
overcome the presumption); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238,
2242 (2011) (arguing that an invalidity defense must be proven by a clear and
convincing evidence standard).
202. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. 2014-1301, 2015 WL 4097949,
at *5 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2005) (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that the AIA
conveyed rulemaking authority to the PTO, and that the director shall prescribe
regulations setting forth standards for instituting the AIA proceedings).
203. See id. (according to the rulemaking authority of the PTO, it
promulgated 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), which provided that a claim shall be given
its broadest reasonable construction).
204. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b) (2012) (stating the rule); 77 Fed.
Reg. 48,680, 48,688, 48,690, 48,697 (Aug. 14, 2012) (discussing the historical
basis for the rule).
205. 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,697.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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a person having ordinary skill in the art” 208 as the governing
standard. 209
Nonetheless, as Judge Pauline Newman pointed out in her
dissent from the Federal Circuit upholding the PTO’s
approach, while it is true that the court
approved the use of ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ as
an expedient in examination and reexamination, [the]
approval was based on the unfettered opportunity to amend
in those proceedings. That opportunity is not present in
Inter Partes Review; amendment of claims requires
permission, and since the inception of Inter Partes Review,
motions to amend have been granted in only two cases,
although many have been requested. 210

In other words, unlike in other Patent Office proceedings,
where the applicant is engaged in a process of negotiations
with the Office over the scope of the claims, 211 in IPR, the
patentee is engaged in a process of litigation where the
meaning of the claims is nearly fixed. 212 Indeed, this was the
very purpose Congress had in mind when it created the IPR.
As the House report accompanying the bill stated, “[t]he Act
converts inter partes reexamination from an examinational to
an adjudicative proceeding.” 213 The PTAB itself recognized as
much, holding in an early IPR proceeding that “[a]n inter
partes review is neither a patent examination nor a patent

208. Menell et al., Patent Case Management Judicial Guide, § 5.2.3.1.2 at 5–
49 (2d ed. 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2114398
(last visited Apr. 6, 2016).
209. See 77 Fed. Reg. 48,697 (Aug. 14 2012) (noting the historical roots of
requiring the PTO to give patent claims their broadest reasonable construction
consistent with the specification in patentability determination proceedings).
210. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 2015 WL 4097949 (Fed. Cir. July 8,
2015) (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
211. See supra notes 169–174 and accompanying text (discussing the give
and take negotiation style in which the applicant and PTO engage).
212. See Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“Courts construe claim terms in order to assign a fixed, unambiguous, legally
operative meaning to the claim.”).
213. H.R. REP. NO. 112–98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011).
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reexamination.” 214 Rather, it is a trial, adjudicatory in nature
and constitutes litigation.” 215 The PTAB further noted that there
are no “prosecution activities” in an IPR. 216
Making matters worse still, the AIA required the PTO to
dispense with the “clear and convincing” standard for the
showing of invalidity. 217 Instead, a challenger to any issued claim
carries her burden by meeting a much laxer “preponderance of
the evidence” standard. 218 The upshot is that the Patent Office
adopted IPR rules that nullified the expectations of the patentees
about the scope of their patent rights, and it did so without a
meaningful opportunity to “renegotiate” those rights with the
PTO, while the Act itself undermined, if not altogether abolished,
what is perhaps the most meaningful component of a patent
right—the robust presumption of validity. 219 The effect of this
“one-two punch” is discussed in the next Part.
D. The Effect of the Post-Issuance Review Process
The distinctions regarding claim construction and quantum
of proof required in Article III courts versus those required in
PTAB proceedings are not just grist for an academic debate.
Instead, these distinctions have dramatic effects in the “real
world.” It has always been the case that some of the patents duly
issued by the Patent Office are thereafter invalidated by a
judicial decision. 220 Some of these invalidations stem from the
214. Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, Docket No. 26,
at 7 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).
215. Google, Inc. v. Jongerius Panoramic Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00191,
Docket No. 50, at 4 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2014) (granting motion for pro hac vice
admission).
216. Id.
217. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (2012) (establishing a preponderance of
the evidence standard when the petitioner has the burden to prove a proposition
of unpatentability).
218. Id.
219. See id. § 282(a) (providing the presumption of validity for patent
claims).
220. See supra note 190 (reporting percentages of how many litigated claims
are found to be invalid); ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE COMM. ON PATENTS, H.R. MIS.
DOC. 50, at 135–36 (2d Sess. 1878) (argument of J.J. Storrow) (discussing the

TAKING PATENTS

755

PTO misapprehending the law or applying the law incorrectly, 221
while others may originate in the PTO not being aware of some
invalidating prior art, 222 and others still due to the patentee
committing fraud on the PTO. 223 That granted patents can be
invalidated is not a surprise to anyone—including patentees
themselves—and is and has always been part of the legal
landscape. Indeed, when markets valuate a patent, they take into
account the possibility that upon judicial scrutiny the patent may
be found to be invalid. 224 A study by Professors Mark Lemley and
John Allison showed that the rate of invalidation in judicial
proceedings is just under 50%. 225 Yet, that includes all causes of
invalidation, and not just invalidation for lack of novelty or
obviousness. Invalidation for these two causes is limited to about
33% of litigated patents. 226 Another recent study by Shawn Miller
that attempted to quantify the proper invalidation rate,
suggested that about 28% of all patents are invalid if subjected to
correct anticipation or obviousness analysis. 227 According to this
benefits of patents and explaining that they are only granted to inventors who
have created a new and useful art or composition of matter).
221. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (invalidating a granted patent because the PTO
misapprehended the proper test for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
222. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1249 (2013) (noting that the PTO will often
erroneously issue a patent on the belief that it is valid, when in fact it is invalid
due to the vastness of prior art).
223. See Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 137
(2008) (considering the multiple ways in which patent applicants can commit
fraud upon the PTO, for example by failing to disclose material information or
by submitting false information).
224. See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1761
(acknowledging the fact that a significant number of patents that make it to
court are ultimately held invalid).
225. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 190, at 205–06 (noting that there is a
wide disparity of validity rates across regional circuits, even though the average
rate of all the circuits was just under 50%). For other studies confirming the
same approximate invalidity rates, see supra note 190.
226. Allison & Lemley, supra note 190, at 209 (citing obviousness as the
most frequently used basis for judicial invalidation of patents).
227. See Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the
Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH.
1, 6–7 (2013) (showing that the results of the author’s study suggest that the
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study, the courts are invalidating roughly as many patents as
they should be invalidating based on these criteria if they were
getting the law correct all the time. Indeed, the courts are
somewhat over-invalidating patents, but the numbers are in line
with what the Miller study predicts ought to be happening. 228
The invalidation numbers in the post-issuance proceedings
are starkly different. The rate of invalidation in IPR proceedings
exceeds 75% of all claims subject to adjudication. 229 The CBMR
numbers are more eye-popping still. In the CBMR proceedings
the claims are invalidated at a rate of over 90%. 230 The question
is what accounts for such disparity between district court
invalidation rates and PTAB invalidation rates.
One possible answer is that the patents tested in the PTA
crucible are just weaker and, therefore, are more likely to be
invalidated. Under this hypothesis, the high percentage of
invalidation at the PTAB indicates nothing other than selection
bias. This hypothesis suggests that, if the same patents were
litigated in court, the invalidation rate would be much the same.
The problem with this line of thinking, however, is that a number
of patents that have been invalidated in the PTAB proceedings
have gone through litigation—including an appeal to the Federal
Circuit. 231 Although the patent survived the litigation unscathed,
the PTO ordered an IPR or CBMR of the patents in question and
then invalidated the challenged claims at the same rate as it did
for patents that have not been through the crucible of

patent system’s efficiency is harmed by the existence of too many non-innovative
patents).
228. Compare id. (suggesting a proper invalidity rate of 28% based on
anticipation and obviousness), with Allison & Lemley, supra note 190, at 209
(reporting a 33% district court invalidation rate based on these same criteria).
229. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 926 (“Looking at the
total number of claims in all IPRs that have been considered by the PTAB
versus the number of claims that survived, the same general picture emerges—a
nearly 75% invalidation rate.”).
230. See id. at 930 (“The per-case invalidation rate in CBMR is over 90% and
per-claim rate is over 94%.”).
231. Id. at 927–29 (“One reason to doubt that the patents in the first wave of
IPR are particularly ‘weak’ is the fact that a number of them have been through
litigation or reexamination or both.”).
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litigation. 232 Other data also undermine the “selection bias”
hypothesis. Thus,
only 31% of IPR petitions rely only on “new” (i.e., previously
unconsidered) prior art. Three percent rely on old art or art
that was already considered by the patent examiner and not
found to be invalidating, and 66% rely on a mixture of old and
new art. But, all of the petitions are successful at high levels.
Of the final written decisions, petitions relying on new art only
and old art only result in the identical invalidation rate of
93%, while those relying on mixture of old and new art result
in the invalidation rate of 81%. 233

Additionally, “15% of patents in IPR have been involved in
and emerged from a previous reexamination . . . . Of these
patents that have already received [this] second favorable look,
60% were fully invalidated in the IPR proceedings, and 8% were
partially invalidated, for a per claim invalidation rate of 83%.” 234
Thus, the data undermines the hypothesis that the reason for
high invalidation rate is selection bias and the weakness of the
patents in the IPR. The patents being invalidated in these
proceedings are not egregiously weak. 235 Instead, these are
patents that have survived litigation and reexamination—and
sometimes both. 236 Something else must then be at work.
The financial markets also recognize that it is not the
inherent weakness of the patents that drives the high
invalidation rate at the PTAB. For example, the stock market
reacted very negatively to the news that an IPR was requested on
a particular patent, though that patent had been upheld in prior
litigation and a federal jury had concluded it was worth $300
million. 237 The mere fact that an IPR petition was filed caused
the patentee’s stock to plummet “by 25%, which translated into a
232. Id. at 927–31 (noting that the PTO may still invalidate a patent during
an IPR or CBMR even after it was ruled valid through litigation).
233. Id. at 928.
234. Id. at 927.
235. See id. (providing reasons to doubt that the patents in the first wave of
IPR are particularly weak).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 932–33 (“[T]he system can be used to destroy not just the value of
a patent, but the value of a patentee’s entire enterprise.”).
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250 million dollar loss in market capitalization.” 238 This
happened before the PTAB decided whether to institute a trial
with respect to the challenged patent, much less adjudicated the
merits of the dispute. 239 One would have thought that a patent
that has survived litigation after a strong challenge by, of all
parties, Apple 240—a company with nearly limitless resources—
would be in no danger from the “second look” administered by the
PTO. Yet, the collective market wisdom concluded otherwise. The
reason it concluded otherwise, and the reason for the disparity in
invalidation rates between the courts and the PTAB, is the
difference in claim construction and the burden of proof on the
patent challenger in these fora. 241
Before moving on to the next Part, we wish to address the
question of why reexamination was so much less “deadly” to
patents than current post-issuance procedures. After all, in both
ex parte and inter partes reexamination, claims were given their
broadest reasonable construction. 242 Yet, the “kill” rate in
reexamination was much lower than what is seen in IPR and
CBMR. For example, in ex parte reexamination, 25% of patents
emerge completely unscathed, while another “two-thirds of the
patents exit reexamination with some changes made to the
claims. 243 Only 12% of all patents that enter reexamination fail to
238. Id. at 933.
239. See id. (showing that just the ability to request IPR is a powerful tool).
240. See VirnetX, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 816, 825 (E.D. Tex.
2013) (demonstrating that not even a powerful company like Apple can escape
the second look administered by the PTO), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in
part sub nom. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
241. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 903 (“[I]nstead of
becoming an alternative avenue to resolving issues of patent validity, the
reexamination process simply bifurcates the dispute resolution in two different
fora.”).
242. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.552 (2012) (ex parte reexamination); 37 C.F.R. § 1.906
(inter partes reexamination); see also Scope of Inter Partes Reexamination,
MANUAL OF PAT. EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE
(Nov. 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2658.html (last visited
Apr. 25, 2016) (stating that “[i]nter partes reexamination does not, however,
differ from ex parte reexamination as to the substance to be considered in the
proceeding”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
243. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 923–24 (“[N]early a
quarter of all patents exit the reexamination with all claims confirmed.”).
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receive the reexamination certificate.” 244 The inter partes
reexamination was somewhat less favorable to the patentees, but
still not as likely to invalidate a patent as IPR or CBMR. In inter
partes reexamination, 31% of patents had all of the challenged
claims rejected and 8% of all of the claims confirmed. 245 The
remaining 61% of patents survived only following claim
amendments. 246 The picture that emerges from these data is that
the key to post-issuance proceedings in the PTO under the
“broadest reasonable construction” standard is the “unfettered
opportunity to amend in those proceedings.” 247 This ability is de
facto absent in the AIA-created procedures. 248 In the first thirty
months of AIA procedures, only two—out of more than fifty—
motions to amend claims were granted, resulting in twenty-two
amended claims being allowed. 249 Making matters even more
dramatic, out of those three motions, one was in relation to a
patent owned by the U.S. government, and the motion
encountered no opposition from the patent challenger. 250 The
PTAB explained that in post-issuance proceedings, the patentee
has no right to amend the claims and held that the law “places
the burden on the patent owner to show a patentable distinction
of each proposed substitute claim over the prior art.” 251 The
244. Id.
245. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING
DATA—SEPT. 30, 2013, at 1, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter_parte_
historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2013.pdf (providing data on the number of IPR
requests and filings).
246. See id. (providing additional data on IPR requests and filings).
247. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Newman, J., dissenting) opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g 2015 WL
4097949 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2015).
248. See id. (“[W]hen claims in reexamination are not eligible for
amendment . . . the PTO instructs examiners not to use the broadest reasonable
interpretation.”); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. 2014-1301, 2015 WL
4100060, at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2015) (Prost, C.J., Newman, Moore, O’Malley,
Reyna, JJ., dissenting) (“IPRs do not bear the traits that justify the broadest
reasonable construction . . . there is no robust right to amend.”).
249. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 929 (noting that the
advantage of PTAB’s motion to amend claims is purely ephemeral).
250. See id. (“In every other case (forty-eight in total), the motion to amend
was denied.”).
251. Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, Docket No. 26,
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PTAB denied motions to amend when it viewed the patentee’s
arguments as insufficiently detailed to explain why the proposed
amendments would be patentable. 252 This posture is in stark
contrast with initial patent examination and reexamination. In
those procedures, it is the examiner that bears the initial burden
of proof to show that the claim as presented by the applicant is
unpatentable in view of any of the requirements of the Patent
Act. 253
Thus, unlike the reexamination where two-thirds of the
claims are amended and then exit the reexamination process
confirmed in this new form, 254 the opportunity to amend in IPR
and CBMR is ephemeral at best. In In re Cuozzo, 255 five judges of
the Federal Circuit noted as much, writing in a rare joint dissent
from the court’s refusal to take up the issue of proper claim
construction in IPR en banc that
[d]uring IPRs, there is no back-and-forth between the patentee
and examiner seeking to resolve claim scope ambiguity; there
is no robust right to amend. . . . During this process, the
patentee is not given the right to amend its claims, but must
instead seek the permission of the Board. Even then, the
patentee is limited to “one motion to amend,” with additional
motions allowed only “to materially advance the settlement of

at 7 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).
252. See, e.g., ScentAir Tech., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc., IPR2013-00179, Docket
No. 60, at 27–30 (2015) (showing the increased difficulty for a patentee
attempting to amend claims); see also PTAB Decision Highlights Little Used
Claim Amendment Process in America Invents Act Patent Challenges, FISH &
RICHARDSON (June 17, 2015) http://fishpostgrant.com/alert/ptab-decisionhighlights-aia-patent-challenges/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2016) (describing a
patentee’s difficulty in amending his or her claims) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
253. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[I]f the
applicant can provide evidence or argument in support of unobviousness, such
evidence and argument will be considered, and the question of patentability will
be redecided on the entire record.”).
254. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (“[T]wo-thirds of the patents
exit reexamination with some changes to the claim . . . .”).
255. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., Inc., No. 2014-1301, 2015 WL 4100060 (Fed.
Cir. July 8, 2015)
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a proceeding” or “as permitted by regulations prescribed by the
Director.” 256

In short, unlike the previous “second look” regimes, IPR and
CBMR have both drastically changed the scope of the right that
the patentees thought they bargained for and failed to provide
them with a meaningful substitute for the vested rights lost.
Nevertheless, before addressing the constitutionality of this
action, we need to consider the law of takings generally as it has
developed over time.
IV. The History of Eminent Domain
For nearly as long as there has been a concept of “private
property,” governments have expressly or inherently retained the
right to reclaim that property for uses that they have deemed
appropriate. 257 In the United States, the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution expressly reserves the right to take personal
property from private individuals while providing that no
property shall be taken without some form of payment. 258 The
Takings Clause states that “nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.” 259 Yet, as the case law
has developed over time, in particular since the Industrial
Revolution, the government has increased its ability to take
property from private citizens, both by creating new means of
taking, such as through zoning and city planning, 260 and by
broadening the definition of “public use” to the point where
virtually any use could be conceived of as for the public benefit. 261
256. Id. at *4 (Prost, C.J., Newman, Moore, O’Malley, Reyna, JJ., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
257. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (elaborating on the “Takings Clause,” which
allows the government to take property if just compensation is provided).
258. Id.
259. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
260. For a discussion on the adoption of city planning in the United States
and the role of eminent domain, see J. S. Young, City Planning and Restrictions
on the Use of Property, 9 MINN. L. REV. 518, 520 (1924–1925) (stating that the
United States has four means of acquiring private property for public use,
including “taxation, proprietary, eminent domain, and police [powers]”).
261. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (expanding
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A. The Fifth Amendment and the Takings Clause

In the years surrounding the adoption of the Constitution,
there was a deep-seated and continuing distrust of a large and
powerful government. While never denying that there may be
instances in which utilitarianism would doubtlessly permit
certain property takings, the drafters of the Constitution included
a restriction: the requirement that property owners be
compensated for any such taking. 262 The “just compensation”
portion of the clause was entirely new, moving beyond simple due
process toward an official recognition that land had value to the
owner because he had made the effort to improve the land and
make it useful. 263 Just because the land could be more useful to
others did not mean that the owner’s right to use the land for his
own benefit could be unilaterally usurped. In the bundle of sticks,
the property owner had as much right to not use the land as he
did to use it. Eminent domain would allow the government to
take land that could be used for the common good while
acknowledging that the property had some value to its previous
owner, even if the owner chose not to use it for any particular
purpose. 264
As the post-Civil War era turned into the Industrial
Revolution, and then into the Civil Rights Movement, the
questions of procedural and substantive due process would begin
to shape the parallel law on takings and eminent domain.

the definition of “public use” to include the concept of economic development).
262. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”).
263. Id.
264. Some might argue that this is the inherent flaw in Locke’s labor theory.
If a man who has acquired land through his hard work chooses then to let the
land go fallow, is that not his right? Locke argues that once land is acquired, it
would be wasteful not to put it to its use, “for it is labour indeed that puts the
value on everything.” John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 40 (Hollis
ed., 1689). Under that theory, the government should not have to pay to take
land that is not actively cultivated or put to use.
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B. Without Due Process of Law
The Fifth Amendment clearly states that no man shall lose
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 265 Due
process is both procedural—a question of the process of the
government (did a citizen get some kind of hearing)—and
substantive, meaning the Court was allowed to review the
“substance” of the legislation in question via the Due Process
Clause. 266 As states tried to rebuild and aggrieved private parties
filed Fifth Amendment Takings claims, courts continually
reviewed the new legislation to ensure the laws were fair to all
parties involved.
In 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a Pennsylvania
regulation that was intended to protect the rights of individual
landowners from the dangerous methods employed by mining
companies. 267 The landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon, 268 involved regulations prohibiting corporations from
mining coal in the ground under streets, houses, and places of
public assembly. Pennsylvania Coal held the mineral rights to
numerous properties whose surface rights were owned by other—
often unsuspecting—individuals to whom Pennsylvania Coal had
sold them. 269 The legislation had been enacted to protect the
residents from unanticipated cave-ins and other dangers
associated with living and working on the surface while the coal
mine dredged the land literally out from under them. 270
Pennsylvania Coal argued successfully that the prohibition of
mining amounted to a government taking without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 271 The
Supreme Court held that, though property regulation may be
265. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
266. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“They [the courts] are
at liberty, indeed, are under solemn duty, to look at the substance of things,
whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended
the limits of its authority.”).
267. Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 412.
270. Id. at 418–19.
271. Id. at 416.
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permitted, where “the regulation goes too far,” 272 as it did here,
the overly restrictive law amounts to a compensable taking.
Despite the Court’s finding that a taking had occurred, no
compensation was ordered. 273 Presumably, resumption of mining
was compensation enough to the mining company.
On the heels of its decision in Pennsylvania Coal, the
Supreme Court heard a series of cases involving new—to the
United States 274—regulatory techniques called “zoning” and
urban planning. Two of these cases were in tension with one
another: Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 275 and Nectow v. City
of Cambridge. 276 In Euclid, the plaintiff challenged a generalized
zoning and city plan on the grounds that the structured
assignment of commercial and industrial zones denied the
property owners due process of law in that they had no
opportunity to challenge the designation. 277 The Court, however,
upheld the zoning ordinance as a “valid exercise of authority,” 278
ruling that zoning laws are not, as a general category,
unconstitutional restrictions on the rights of the property
owner. 279 The Court went so far as to declare:
[W]e are not prepared to say that the end in view was not
sufficient to justify the general rule of the ordinance . . . . It
cannot be said that the ordinance in this respect passes the
bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely
arbitrary fiat. Moreover, the restrictive provisions of the
ordinance in this particular may be sustained upon the
principles applicable to the broader exclusion from residential
districts of all business and trade structures. 280

The public interest in “increas[ing] the safety and security of
home life . . . by reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in
272. Id. at 415.
273. Id. at 416.
274. For a discussion of the United States’ slow adoption of city planning
and zoning, see generally J. S. Young, supra note 262.
275. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
276. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
277. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 389 (internal citation omitted).
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residential sections, decreas[ing] noise and other conditions
which produce or intensify nervous disorders, [and] preserv[ing] a
more favorable environment in which to rear children,” 281 clearly
surpassed the right of the property owner to use his property as
he desired. 282
Conversely, in Nectow, the Court found that, while the
zoning ordinance in question was constitutionally sound in
general, it was unsustainable as applied to the particular
plaintiff. 283 In Nectow, the zoning ordinance itself seemed to be
facially similar to that in Euclid, wherein zones for residential,
industrial and unrestricted use were created. Though the Court
found that the ordinance met the new “substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare” 284 standard set
forth in Euclid, it held that the ordinance as applied to this
particular plaintiff was “an invasion of the property of plaintiff
[and] was serious and highly injurious.” 285 Yet, the only remedy
offered in this instance was an injunction preventing enforcement
of the ordinance, not compensation for the taking. 286 Oddly, the
handful of cases evaluated during this time focused on the
substantive due process rationale rather than on the terms of the
Takings Clause itself, and they generally failed to offer any type
of compensation when a taking was found. 287
The message of these early cases on takings was that, while
the government was allowed to regulate private property to some
extent and even when that diminished the value of the property,
the Takings Clause would be triggered by the removal of
particular elements from the “bundle of sticks.” The fight
continued, however, about the kind and degree of protection
appropriate in this context.

281. Id. at 394.
282. Id. at 396–97.
283. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928).
284. Id. at 188.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 188–89.
287. See, e.g., id. (offering an injunction as a remedy but not just
compensation for the taking).
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C. All Aboard Penn Central, with Stops at Agins, Lingle, Lucas,
and Loretto
1. Penn Central and the World of Regulatory Takings
In 1978, the Supreme Court returned to its long-dormant and
largely unchallenged Pennsylvania Coal takings analysis to
determine whether a local government had gone "too far" in
denying an owner’s right to develop and largely reshape a New
York landmark, Grand Central Terminal. 288 The developer
challenged an ordinance that prevented any redevelopment of
sites labeled as historic landmarks. 289 The plaintiff urged that
preventing him from utilizing the valuable space on top of Grand
Central Terminal amounted to a taking. 290 In its takings
analysis, the Court enumerated three factors of particular
significance: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations; 291 and (3) the
character of the governmental action, including an analysis of
whether the taking was a physical taking or merely had the effect
of a taking. 292 In evaluating the economic impact of the refusal to
allow “upward” development of the landmark property, the Court
found that, in light of its newly enumerated test, the public
benefit far outweighed any potential economic loss to the
owner. 293 Though the underlying question of whether “some”
compensation qualified as “just” compensation went unanswered
by the Court, 294 it was ultimately determined that some
288. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
289. Id. at 118.
290. For a discussion on “air rights” broadly, a theme that seemingly
befuddled the Court in Penn Central, see generally Frank Schnidman &
Cameron Roberts, Municipal Air Rights: New York City’s Proposal to Sell Air
Rights over Public Buildings and Public Spaces, 15 URB. L. 347 (1983).
291. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 138 (“The restrictions imposed are substantially related to the
promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use
of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to
enhance . . . the Terminal site . . . .”).
294. See id. at 137 (discussing the issue of transferable development rights
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compensation was apparently better than none, and the zoning
regulations stood. 295
2. Agins v. City of Tiburon
Just three short years later, the Court reconfigured its
regulation-takings analysis into a two-part “either or” test. In
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 296 the Court asked whether the
regulation “substantially advanced a legitimate state interest” or
whether the regulation “denied an owner economically viable use
of land.” 297 The Court suddenly viewed the question of regulatory
taking as a question of whether the Nectow (substantial state
interest) or Penn Central (economically viable use of the land)
analysis should apply rather than a combination of the two
analyses. 298 The Agins Court enunciated that, because plaintiffs
were free to pursue their residential development elsewhere,
there could be no taking and that the zoning regulations in
question did not deny the “justice and fairness guaranteed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 299 Agins adopted the
economic analysis of Penn Central without consideration for the
compelling state interest.
3. Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc.
Agins was, however, a short-lived rule, abrogated twenty-five
years later in Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 300 which eliminated
as a partial solution which granted the owners of Grand Central some value to
the lost space above the landmark property).
295. The Court took into account the existence of transferable development
rights that the plaintiffs in the case received as part of the regulatory scheme
and that had the potential to diminish the financial blow to them; this led the
Court to conclude that an adjustment rather than deprivation of property rights
was taking place. Id. at 137–38.
296. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
297. Id. at 260.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 263.
300. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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the “substantially advanced a legitimate state interest” prong. 301
The Lingle Court at long last declared that the substantial
advancement test was clearly not a constitutional factor
enumerated in the Takings Clause and had been an improperly
judicially created standard. 302 The issue in Lingle focused on
lease limitations on gas stations. 303 The Hawaii legislature
enacted a law limiting gas station leases to no more than 15% of
fuel sales gross profits and 15% of profits from non-fuel sales. 304
The Chevron Corporation argued that the limitation amounted to
a taking and the trial court disagreed. 305 It held, in line with
Penn Central, that Chevron would essentially “win some, lose
some” and because there was not a complete loss of value in the
property, and the taking substantially advanced a government
interest in protecting the gas dealers and the public from high
prices, there could be no taking. 306 Upon review, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that Agins’ substantial advancement
prong was an evaluation of the Due Process Clause, not the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and was therefore not
the appropriate evaluation. 307 Lingle in effect swung the
pendulum back from the substantive due process evaluation the
Court had been using since Pennsylvania Coal to the literal “just
compensation” analysis that is set forth in the language of the
Takings Clause.

301. Id. at 540.
302. See id. at 540–43 (“There is no question that the ‘substantially
advances’ formula was derived from due process, not takings, precedent.”).
303. Id. at 528.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 532–34.
306. See id. at 533 (“Chevron swiftly moved for summary judgment on its
takings claim, arguing that the rent cap does not substantially advance any
legitimate government interest.”).
307. Id. at 540.
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4. Lucas and Loretto as Tests for Total Regulatory and Physical
Takings
The Lingle court relied on the parallel theories of “total
regulatory taking,” as set forth in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 308 and of “physical takings” in Loretto v.
Teleprompter 309 to justify the shift away from state interest back
toward the injury to the property owner. 310 Lucas established
that a total regulatory taking occurs when regulations completely
deprive an owner of “all economically beneficial use,” 311 while
Loretto established that a physical taking occurred when a
property owner suffers a permanent physical invasion of her
property—at the hands of the government or a private party—
even when that taking is relatively minor, such as the
installation of a cable wire on the front and roof of one’s
apartment building. 312 When either type of taking occurs, the
intruding party must provide just compensation.
When it comes to Loretto, the intrusion that the plaintiff in
the case suffered was insignificant in regard to the decline in
value incurred, given that it was equipment mostly consisting of
cables and cable boxes affixed to the outside of a building. 313
Nonetheless, the Court stated that a permanent physical
occupation “is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an
owner’s property interests. . . . [T]he government does not simply
take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of property rights: it chops
through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.” 314 It added
that “property law has long protected an owner’s expectation that
he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his
property. To require, as well, that the owner permit another to
308. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
309. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
310. See id. at 441 (affirming that a permanent physical occupation of
property is a taking, even if the permanent installation is of minimal size).
311. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
312. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
313. See id. at 422 (describing the intrusion as “a cable slightly less than
one-half inch in diameter and of approximately 30 feet in length” along with
“two large silver boxes”).
314. Id. at 435.
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exercise complete dominion literally adds insult to injury.” 315
Last, the Court emphasized that permanent occupations present
few issues of proof. 316
D. Sour Grapes in Horne v. Department of Agriculture
Recently, the Supreme Court decided a case dealing with an
administrative marketing order that required growers to set
aside a certain percentage of raisin crops for the government at
no charge and with at most the hope of recouping a percentage of
the government’s profits when selling the raisins, should those
profits exist. 317 The petitioner refused to set aside raisins,
arguing that this was an unconstitutional taking, and the
government fined the petitioners the fair market value of the
raisins plus civil penalties as a result. 318 The Court held that this
constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment, which was of
particular significance because it was the first time that the
Court unambiguously applied the Takings Clause to personal
property rather than real property. 319 Notably, the Court did not
mince words when it stated: “Nothing in this history suggests

315. Id. at 436.
316. See id. at 437 (“The placement of a fixed structure on land or real
property is an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to dispute.”).
317. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424–25 (2015) (setting
forth the facts of the case and noting that “[t]he question is whether the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars the Government from imposing such a
demand on the growers without just compensation”).
318. See id. at 2425 (noting that the Hornes were fined an amount “equal to
the market value of the missing raisins—some $480,000—as well as an
additional civil penalty of just over $200,000 for disobeying the order to turn
them over”).
319. See id. at 2425–28 (answering in the negative the question of
“[w]hether the government’s ‘categorical duty’ under the Fifth Amendment to
pay just compensation when it ‘physically takes possession of an interest in
property’ . . . applies only to real property and not to personal property”); Tom
W. Bell, “Property” in the Constitution: The View From the Third Amendment,
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1243, 1246 (2012) (discussing “precedents
suggesting that the Takings Clause protects personal property less completely
than it does real property”).
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that personal property was any less protected against physical
appropriation than real property.” 320 It went on to explain:
[A patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in
the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used
by the government itself, without just compensation, any more
than it can appropriate or use without compensation land
which has been patented to a private purchaser. 321

This reconfirms the Court’s position that patents are the
beneficiaries of Fifth Amendment protection just as much as
pieces of land. 322
The Supreme Court further explained that the government’s
decision to take possession and control of the raisins results in a
taking as much “as if the Government held full title and
ownership.” 323 The Court noted that the growers’ retention of “a
contingent interest of indeterminate value does not mean there
has been no physical taking, particularly since the value of the
interest depends on the discretion of the taker, and may be
worthless, as it was for one of the two years at issue here.” 324 The
government’s argument that the regulatory scheme resulted in
higher prices for the remaining raisins did not sway the Court to
hold that no taking had occurred. 325 This entire line of reasoning
would presumably apply in the patent context as well, and even
contingent interests in patents would not eliminate the
possibility that a taking took place. The Horne case shows that
320. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427.
321. Id. (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)).
322. See Adam Mossoff, Supreme Court Recognizes That Patents Are
Property, CTR. FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP. BLOG, June 22, 2015,
http://cpip.gmu.edu/2015/06/22/supreme-court-recognizes-that-patents-are-property/
(last visited Apr. 22, 2016) (“I am pleased to see the Supreme Court reiterate
what it said over a century ago: A patented invention stands the same as other
types of property, and its taking by the government without adequate
compensation is unconstitutionally unjust.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
323. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 431 (1982)).
324. Id. at 2429.
325. See id. at 2432 (rejecting the “notion that general regulatory activity
such as enforcement of quality standards can constitute just compensation for a
specific physical taking”).
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even when some interest remains in personal property, a category
in which the Court also situates patents, a taking can occur. 326
V. Post-Issuance Review as a Taking
A. Are Patents Property?
There is a tension between scholars as to the question of
whether patents should be protected as property rights. 327 Adam
Mossoff and Simone Rose have stated their view unambiguously:
“Patents are property.” 328 Mossoff argues that the application of
the Takings Clause to patents has a long historical pedigree
rather than arising out of modern legal interpretations. 329 John
Duffy agrees that patents “should be treated as a species of
property.” 330 Judge Frank Easterbrook from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in a scholarly
326. See id. at 2433 (ruling that “the Hornes should simply be relieved of the
obligation to pay the fine and associated civil penalty they were assessed when
they resisted the Government’s effort to take their raisins” even though the
Hornes retained an economic interest in the seized raisins).
327. See generally Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property
Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing the
propertization of intellectual property); Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter
Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993)
(considering the implications of the debate over whether intellectual property is
property); Irina D. Manta & Robert E. Wagner, Intellectual Property
Infringement as Vandalism, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 331 (2015) (analyzing the
relationship between intellectual property and property law, including as it
applies to the sanctions regime of intellectual property).
328. Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689,
690 (2007) [hereinafter Mossoff, Constitutional Private Property]; see also
Simone A. Rose, Patent “Monopolyphobia”: A Means of Extinguishing the
Fountainhead?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509, 515 (1999) (recommending that the
Patent Act be amended to clarify that “patents are property”); Adam Mossoff,
The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2013) (“Patents
have long been identified as property rights in American law.”).
329. See Mossoff, Constitutional Private Property, supra note 327, at 700–11
(discussing nineteenth-century cases recognizing patents as property and
concluding that this “jurisprudence was quite clear: patents were private
property rights secured under the Constitution”).
330. John F. Duffy, Comment, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the
Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2005).
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symposium: “Except in the rarest case, we should treat
intellectual and physical property identically in the law . . . .” 331
One of the leading textbooks in intellectual property explains:
“Patent law is a property-rights regime . . . .” 332
Shubha Ghosh argues that, while “private property has been
read to encompass both real and personal property[,] [a]pplication
to intellectual property or intangible property would occur only
through analogy.” 333 Davida Isaacs mainly criticizes the
application of the Takings Clause to patents on two grounds:
first, because patentholders already receive compensation for
most government uses of patented technologies; second, because
regulatory claims would allow patentholders to intervene when
the government limits the circumstances under which they can
assert claims or the damages they can receive. 334 Many scholars
have emphasized that, rather than focus on the relationship
between patents and property law, one should ask both with
regard to the delineation of liability and of proper remedies what
would advance a utilitarian purpose. 335 Meanwhile, Cynthia Ho
331. Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 118 (1990).
332. CRAIG ALLEN NARD ET AL., THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 27 (4th
ed. 2014).
333. Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual
Property: The Path Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 637, 667 (2000).
334. See Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why Modern
Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right
to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2007) (arguing that “the Takings
Clause’s command to furnish ‘just compensation’ . . . would in most situations
simply be superfluous” and “that establishing Takings Clause protection for
patents could effectively put the government in a policy stasis”).
335. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 542 (2005) (arguing that most modern-day property
scholars base their understandings on utilitarianism rather than natural
rights); Chiang, Patent Boundaries, supra note 189, at 545 (arguing in favor of
using a utilitarian basis to decide how to amend claims); David S. Olson, Taking
the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting
Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 183 (2009) (“[A] properly
crafted patent law should provide enough property rights to incentivize the
socially desirable (efficient) level of innovation, and no more.”); Ted Sichelman,
Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 530–33
(2014) (arguing against the view that patent infringement remedies should
make whole the plaintiff and in favor of a more utilitarian view of each case).
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describes the view held by a number of individuals in the public
health context including the U.N. Commissioner for Human
Rights, that patents are a privilege rather than a property
right. 336 As Michael Davis summed up that position, “[c]alling
patents property . . . fails to properly analyze the patent
bargain. . . . Nothing is inevitably or incurably wrong with calling
the temporary privileges property, but the concept is certainly far
removed from the general notion of property.” 337
Whoever carries the debate as a theoretical matter, when it
comes to the Fifth Amendment, “[j]udicial precedent and
statutory analysis quite clearly support the proposition that
patents are property. Whether patents share the ‘attributes’ of or
are ‘of the same dignity’ as property, they are property. They
therefore satisfy the property prong of an eminent domain
claim.” 338 The Patent Act itself states that “patents shall have the
attributes of personal property.” 339 Even before the recent
pronouncements by the Supreme Court in Horne, 340 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated in Patlex
Corp. v. Mossinghoff: 341 “It is beyond reasonable debate that
One of the authors has argued that one can simultaneously hold a utilitarian
view of intellectual property and “not see a sharp dividing line between property
and intellectual property.” See Irina D. Manta, Theory and Empirics: Where Do
Locke and Mossoff Leave Us, LIB. OF L. & LIBERTY (May 8, 2015),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/theory-and-empirics-where-do-lockeand-mossoff-leave-us (last visited Apr. 22, 2016) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
336. Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L.
REV. 1047, 1053–57 (2009) (citations omitted); see also James Thuo Gathii, The
Structural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in U.S. Foreign
Policy, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 267, 272 (2003) (“In short, referring to patents
primarily as private property rights is to overshadow their public essence by
overstating their privateness. Such an overstatement of the privateness of
patents is exemplified by the enormous limitations placed on the permissibility
of overriding patents through compulsory and parallel licensing.”).
337. Michael H. Davis, Patent Politics, 56 S.C. L. REV. 337, 376 (2004).
338. Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(A) and the Unconstitutional Taking
of Patents, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 18 (2010–2011).
339. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
340. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the Court’s recognition of patents as
property in the recent case of Horne v. Department of Agriculture).
341. 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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patents are property.” 342 The Federal Circuit has also referred to
a patent as “a bundle of rights which may be divided and
assigned, or retained in whole or part.” 343
The case of Zoltek Corp. v. United States 344 raised some
questions at one point in this context when the Federal Circuit
suggested that, because a patent holder can still exclude the rest
of the world from the use of its carbon fiber technology, the
government’s use of it amounted to mere patent infringement
rather than a taking. 345 The decision by the trial court on this
point was later vacated, however, “[s]ince the Government’s
potential liability under § 1498(a) is established, [the court did]
not and do[es] not reach the issue of the Government’s possible
liability under the Constitution for a taking.” 346 The Supreme
Court left no doubt in Horne, however, as mentioned, that
patents are subject to the Takings Clause. 347
B. Patents Are Subject to the Takings Clause
As most recently demonstrated in Horne, one cannot reject
the proposition that patents are property in the constitutional
sense under controlling Supreme Court doctrine. 348 Not only did
342. Id. at 599.
343. Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d
1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); accord Morrow v. Microsoft Corp.,
499 F.3d 1332, 1341 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that “parties are free to assign
some or all patent rights as they see fit based on their interests and objectives”);
Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing property rights divided between grantor and grantee
in an agreement concerning a patented invention).
344. 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
345. See id. at 1353 (“In sum, the trial court erred in finding that Zoltek
could allege patent infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking under the
Tucker Act . . . .”).
346. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
347. See supra Part IV.D (discussing how Horne “reconfirm[ed] the Court’s
position that patents are the beneficiaries of Fifth Amendment protection just as
much as pieces of land”).
348. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (noting that
the Takings Clause applies to a “patented invention” as much as it applies to
“land” (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882))).
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the Court recognize in Horne that intangible patents are, in a
constitutional sense, identical to tangible raisins, it also
emphatically stated that “[n]othing . . . suggests that personal
property was any less protected against physical appropriation
than real property.” 349 It therefore follows that patents, like any
other private property, can be appropriated by the government
for private use. And if so, such appropriation is forbidden absent
“just compensation.” 350 Yet, two cases seemingly unambiguously
reject this proposition. 351 On closer examination, though, the
cases that are consistently cited for the proposition that there can
be no “taking” of patents cannot bear the weight that is too often
assigned to them.
In Schillinger v. United States, 352 the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that “the [C]onstitution forbids the taking of
private property for public uses without just compensation; that,
therefore, every appropriation of private property by any official
to the uses of the government, no matter however wrongfully
made, creates a claim founded upon the [C]onstitution.” 353
Instead, it held that a claim against the United States for patent
infringement is a claim in tort, rather than in property, and
therefore is not compensable under the Takings Clause. 354 The
Federal Circuit held firm to this reasoning in Zoltek, concluding
that sovereign immunity bars claims against the government for
349. Id.
350. Id. (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)).
351. See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 172 (1894) (rejecting the
argument that a government contractor’s use of plaintiff’s patents entitled
plaintiff to compensation from the government under the Takings Clause);
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In sum, the
trial court erred in finding that Zoltek could allege patent infringement as a
Fifth Amendment taking under the Tucker Act, and we reverse.”).
352. 155 U.S. 163 (1894).
353. Id. at 168.
354. Id. at 169. In Schillinger, the patentee sued the U.S. Government for
actions of its contractor, not those of any government officer acting in his
original capacity. Id. at 166. Because there was no allegation that the
Government in any way encouraged the contractor to infringe a patent, the
Court concluded that there was no contract, express or implied, between the
plaintiff and the Government on which he could pursue his Fifth Amendment
claim. Id. at 169–72.
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patent infringement. 355 The Federal Circuit held that § 1498 was
a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and that a patentee is not
entitled to any other relief or remedy. 356 The conclusion that is
often drawn from these two cases is that a violation of patent
rights does not rise to the level of a constitutional Fifth
Amendment issue. 357
Leaving aside the question of whether either Schillinger or
Zoltek were correctly decided (and we have our doubts), the rule
of law announced in those cases is simply not that broad. All that
these cases stand for is that infringement of a patent is
insufficient to trigger the Takings Clause. 358 But infringement is
not the only way to interfere with patent rights. One can imagine
a hypothetical in which the government would reassign
ownership of a patent from person A to person B. That would be
qualitatively different from the situation facing the courts in
Schillinger and Zoltek. As even the defenders of the outcome in
Zoltek acknowledged
takings claims could occur if the government changed the
patent laws so as to decrease the value of the patent when
enforced against a private infringer—for instance, by
narrowing the circumstances under which a patentholder
355. See Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d at 1349–52 (concluding that “where, as here,
not all steps of a patented process have been performed in the United States,
government liability does not exist”). The only exception to this bar according to
the panel majority is a lawsuit authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which permits a
patentee to bring an “action against the United States in the United States
Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture” whenever the government
infringes a valid patent. Id. at 1350.
356. See id. at 1352–53 (noting that Congress “adopt[ed] a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity” and thus affirming “the trial court’s conclusion that the
infringement allegations at bar are precluded by § 1498(a)”).
357. See, e.g., Isaacs, supra note 334, at 3 (“Upon considering the modern
Supreme Court precedent pertaining to federal benefits, it becomes clear that
patentholders are not entitled to a Takings Clause remedy.”); Mossoff,
Constitutional Private Property, supra note 328, at 693 (describing the nearunanimous view among scholars that patents cannot be “taken” under the Fifth
Amendment).
358. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1349 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (recognizing that “the patentee’s recourse for infringement by the
government is limited by the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity
established by the Congressional consent to be sued”).
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could assert a claim or by limiting the damages that the
patentholder could obtain. This could happen where new
legislation reduces or eliminates subject matter from patent
protection, narrows patents' scope, or reduces patent
remedies. 359

Even on its own terms, Schillinger would support the
proposition that when the government changes or breaches a
contract (express or implied) with another party, such a breach
gives rise to a Takings Claim. 360 A patent, aside from being a
property right, is a contract between the patentee and the
public. 361 As Shubha Ghosh notes, “[p]atents are commonly
understood as a hypothetical contract between the inventor and
the government resulting in a quid pro quo of innovation for
exclusivity.” 362 Orin Kerr similarly argues that “[t]he cornerstone
of Congress's scheme to encourage the discovery, development,
and dissemination of practical knowledge is the unilateral
contract offer codified by the Patent Act.” 363 An applicant, if he
overcomes the hurdles of the Act “become[s] contractually
‘entitled to a patent.’” 364 The Supreme Court has endorsed the
conceptualization of a patent as a contract between the patentee
and the public. 365 When the government breaches the terms of
the contract, including after the patentee has “performed” by
359. Isaacs, supra note 334, at 2.
360. See Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 170–71
There was no point in the whole transaction from its commencement
to its close where the minds of the parties met or where there was
anything in the semblance of an agreement. . . . It may be well to
notice some of the cases in which the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims over implied contracts has been sustained.
(citing United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623 (1871)).
361. See David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of
Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 173 (2009) (observing that “a patent
infringement case is a contract-based claim”).
362. Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent
Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1316 (2004).
363. Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 135–36 (2000).
364. Id. at 136 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)).
365. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
150–51 (1989) (describing the patent as a “bargain” between the inventor and
the public).
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disclosing his invention and convincing the Patent Office that he
met all other statutory criteria, the government takes the
patentee’s property even under the restrictive Schillinger
standard. 366
There is an additional reason why infringement may not give
rise to a Takings Clause claim, while a more drastic “adjustment”
of patent rights would do so. When the government infringes a
patent, it leaves all other attributes of ownership with the
patentee. 367 The patentee continues to enjoy the right to exclude
others—just not the government—and to specifically include
others—by licensing; he continues to have the same scope of his
patent as he had before; and he continues to enjoy the ability to
dispose of his property, whether by sale, gift, devise, etc., as he
sees fit. 368 The patent grant as a whole then remains intact,
albeit with the inability to enforce it against one particular actor.
This analysis does not extend to situations in Professor Isaacs’s
hypotheticals, 369 or to the regime created by post-issuance review
proceedings. 370
As we have discussed in Part III, the creation of postissuance review proceedings changed the scope of patent rights
themselves. 371 Whereas one boundary of the exclusive right was
366. Again, the reason the claimant lost in Schillinger can be explained by
the fact that there was no allegation that the Government itself in any way
breached his contract. See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 170 (1894)
(“It is conceded on both sides . . . that whatever the government did was done
with the consent of the patentee and under his implied license.”).
367. See Robert C. Wilmoth, Toward a Congruent and Proportional Patent
Law: Redressing State Patent Infringement After Florida Prepaid v. College
Savings Bank, 55 SMU L. REV. 519, 565 (2002) (“The State can put a patent to
public use without eliminating the patentee’s ability to use the patent himself.”).
368. See id. (“In [the event of patent infringement], a patentee can still
gather fruits of his labor, prevent nongovernmental competitors from infringing,
or license or transfer his right to others.”).
369. See Isaacs, supra note 334, at 2 (inquiring into what “would occur
if . . . Congress decided to eliminate protection for genomes . . . if the statutory
doctrine of equivalents were narrowed, thus removing some competing
technologies from within the patent scope . . . [or] if Congress decided to reduce
patent damages for all or some types of technology”).
370. See supra Part II.C (elaborating on the post-issuance review
proceedings established by Congress via the America Invents Act).
371. See supra Part III.C (discussing how the new procedures have changed
the boundaries of vested patent rights).
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bargained for, the America Invents Act imposed an entirely
different boundary on patentees. It is true that the boundary was
not constricted as we would expect in a traditional takings case
where the government occupies a strip of land that previously
belonged to an individual, but rather the boundary was
expanded. 372 As we have already explained, however, in the world
of patents, this is a somewhat meaningless distinction. For
patentees, broad boundaries may be as dangerous as narrow
ones. 373 Whereas under the latter situation, it would be harder to
argue infringement by third parties, in the former case, it is more
difficult to maintain the validity of the patent. 374 The end result
is the same—loss of the previously granted patent right. If
anything, a broader claim is more problematic to the patentee
than a narrow claim. A patentee with a claim narrowed by
government fiat can still enforce it against the—admittedly
reduced group of—putative infringers. 375 A patentee with a claim
broadened by the government’s meddling may not be able to
enforce it against anyone if the broadening of the claim results in
its invalidation. 376

372. See Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 220 n.34
(2006) (citing MPEP § 2111 for the proposition that “broadest reasonable
construction is . . . broader than the interpretation a court construing an issued
patent would reach . . . .”).
373. See Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967) (“[T]he stronger a patent the weaker it is
and the weaker a patent the stronger it is.”).
374. See id. (explaining that “the patent with narrow claims . . . is weak as
protection,” but the strong patent that “contains broad claims” is “weak in that
it may be easier to invalidate”); Yelderman, supra note 75, at 80 (observing that
“a claim that is too broad runs the risk of being invalid, and may fare no better
in litigation than a claim that is too narrow”).
375. See Yelderman, supra note 75, at 123–24 (“If applicants care about
enforcement outcomes, this shift in presumptions can be expected to lead to
narrower, higher quality claims being filed in the first instance.”).
376. See Chiang, Patent Boundaries, supra note 189, at 550–51 (“A
nominally broad claim that is invalid has no legal scope . . . .”).
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C. Was Anything Actually Taken?
The argument we have made thus far is that the AIA
resulted in significant change to the scope of the rights enjoyed by
the patentees through the alteration of the boundaries of those
rights. 377 We recognize, however, that there are several
counterarguments that must be addressed before proceeding
further.
1. The Difference Between AIA Mechanisms and Reexamination
The first question is whether anything actually changed for
anyone. Prior to the AIA’s enactment, there were two distinct
proceedings in the Patent Office that allowed for a “second look”
of already issued patents under the “broadest reasonable
construction” standard. 378 The AIA, it could be said, did nothing
more than change the procedures under which the patents are
reviewed and did not modify the actual scope of the right. 379 After
all, the argument goes, everyone who applied for a patent in 1999
or later would have received a patent subject to the PTO’s ability
to conduct inter partes reexamination under the looser claim
construction standards. 380 That means that a vast majority of
unexpired patents would have been granted subject to that
proviso 381 and that the AIA did nothing to undermine patentees’
377. See supra Parts III.C–D (discussing the broadening of a patentee’s
rights under the AIA).
378. See supra notes 104–120, 242 and accompanying text (discussing the
“reexamination procedure[s] established by the Bayh-Dole Act”).
379. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (observing that the PTO
explained that its claim construction standard under the AIA “is consistent with
what the PTO had been doing” for decades).
380. See supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text (discussing this
“additional reexamination process” created by Congress in 1999).
381. Patents are valid for at most 20 years from the date of filing the
application for the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). They may expire earlier for
non-payment of maintenance fees. Neel U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and
Differential Pricing in the Market for Patents, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855,
1881 (2014). As the AIA was enacted thirteen years after the creation of ex parte
reexamination, one can surmise that most patents have been issued in the
shadow of the inter partes reexamination process.
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expectations as to how their patents would be construed
throughout its lifespan. What is more, all patentees since 1980
were subject to the same broad claim- construction-based “second
look” in ex parte proceedings. 382 So what, if anything, have the
patentees lost?
To answer the above question, we first must disentangle ex
parte reexamination from inter partes reexamination. As it
happens, the Federal Circuit addressed the question of why the
creation of the ex parte reexamination process and its application
to already issued patents does not present a constitutional
problem. 383 In Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 384 a patentee had his
patent subjected to ex parte reexamination—a procedure that
came into being only after the patent issued. 385 The patentee
brought suit alleging that the (then) new procedure effectuated a
taking of his vested property interest. 386 The Federal Circuit
disagreed. Although the appellate court left no doubt that it
viewed patents as property rights, 387 it concluded that “Congress
had an important public purpose in mind when it enacted the
reexamination statute. The statute was part of a larger effort to
revive United States industry’s competitive vitality by restoring
confidence in the validity of patents issued by the PTO.” 388 Given
the importance of this purpose, there was no taking of the
patentee’s property. 389 The focus on public purpose was quite
382. See 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.07 (2015) (“The 1980
Patent Act added procedures under which the patent owner or any other person
may . . . request that the PTO reexamine any claim of that patent on the basis of
the cited prior art.”).
383. See, e.g., MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284,
1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that “the constitutionality . . . of the ex parte
reexamination statute” has been upheld).
384. 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
385. See id. at 597 (noting that the relevant patents “were granted before
passage of the reexamination statute”).
386. Id. at 598.
387. See id. at 599 (“It is beyond reasonable debate that patents are
property.”).
388. Id. at 601.
389. See id. at 602–03 (“We affirm the district court in upholding the
validity of the retroactive statute against Gould’s challenge under the Fifth
Amendment [Takings Clause].”).
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appropriate in 1985 because “public purpose” was a touchstone of
Takings Clause analysis. 390 The Supreme Court relied on this
theory just a few terms prior to Patlex when it held that a
regulation amounts to a taking only when it “does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an
owner economically viable use of his” property. 391 As discussed
above, though, the “substantial state interest” test has now been
explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court, 392 and, therefore,
Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Patlex cannot be relied upon to
uphold the AIA’s regime.
There is an additional reason why Patlex does not foreclose
the argument presented here. In Patlex, the Federal Circuit
viewed the ex parte reexamination procedure as resolving a
dispute between the government and the patentee, rather than
between two private parties. 393 Reexamination was not a
substitute for litigation but truly a “second look” or a “quality
check” on the PTO’s initial decision to issue the patent. 394 That
view cannot be squared with inter partes processes—whether
now obsolete reexamination or the newly created IPR or
CBMR. 395 This is why when Congress created the first inter
partes procedure—inter partes reexamination—it made it
390. See supra notes 296–299 and accompanying text (observing the Court’s
emphasis on “justice and fairness” in Takings Clause cases). Agins and its
“legitimate state interest” was announced in 1980 and not overruled until 2005.
See Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding “that the
‘substantially advances’ formula [of Agins] is not a valid takings test” and
concluding “that it has no proper place in [the Court’s] takings jurisprudence”).
391. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
392. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 (“We conclude that [the substantially
advances] formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a
takings test, and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.”).
393. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that “the grant of a valid patent is primarily a public concern”).
394. See id. (“The reexamination statute’s purpose is to correct errors made
by the government, to remedy defective governmental (not private) action, and if
need be to remove patents that should never have been granted.”).
395. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing these post-issuance review procedures
established by the AIA). For the sake of readability, in this section we will refer
only to IPRs, rather than to both IPRs and CBMRs. However, our arguments
about IPRs apply a fortiori to CBMRs because, due to the breadth of CBMRs,
they have circumscribed patent holders’ property rights even more so than IPRs
have.
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available only prospectively. 396 This is also why five out of eleven
Federal Circuit judges recently acknowledged, when writing in
dissent, that IPRs are fundamentally different from ex parte
reexamination, as they do not bear “examinational hallmarks,”
instead having “similarities to district court litigation.” 397 One of
the five judges who joined the dissent, and for good measure
wrote her own, was Pauline Newman 398—the author of the
opinion in Patlex. 399
But if Patlex does not serve to undermine our argument that,
at least for patents that had been issued by September 16, 2011,
the AIA’s effective date, 400 the AIA worked a taking, then what
about the fact that even prior to that date, patents were subject
to a different, but still inter partes, proceeding—inter partes
reexamination? Why should it matter what form the inter partes
review takes so long as the patentee was on notice that the patent
could be subject to an adversarial process involving another
private party and applying the “broadest reasonable” claim
construction standard? The answer to that question can be found
in the dissents in Cuozzo.
As the dissenting judges noted, the reason the Federal
Circuit has previously endorsed “broadest reasonable” claim
construction in “second look” proceedings is attributable to the
fact that, whether ex parte or inter partes, the reexamination
procedures were in fact “examinational,” that is they allowed for
continued negotiations between the applicant and the Patent
Office. 401 As we have explained, and as the dissent noted, “the
broadest reasonable interpretation standard is a useful tool, prior
to patent issuance, for clarifying the metes and bounds of an
396. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.913 (2001) (providing that a person may only apply for
inter partes reexamination if the patent was “issued from an original
application filed in the United States on or after November 29, 1999”).
397. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1297, 1301 (2015) (Prost,
C.J., Newman, Moore, O’Malley, & Reyna, JJ., dissenting).
398. See generally id. at 1303–06 (Newman, J., dissenting).
399. See generally Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
400. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(f)(2)(A), 125
Stat. 284, 311 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2011)).
401. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1300 (Prost, C.J., Newman, Moore, O’Malley, &
Reyna, JJ., dissenting).
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invention during the back-and-forth between the applicant and
examiner when claims are not yet in their final form.” 402 The
signal feature of a proceeding where “claims are not yet in their
final form” 403 is the ability to amend the claims until they are in
their final (and hopefully acceptable to the PTO) form. 404 It is
that unfettered ability to amend that differentiates
examinational from adjudicatory proceedings. 405
In creating IPRs, Congress was aware that inter partes
reexamination functioned on the examinational model, with the
patentee being able to amend his claims as necessary to obtain a
reexamination certificate. 406 Congress consciously chose to
“convert inter partes reexamination from an examinational to an
adjudicative proceeding” 407 where the opportunity to amend
would be much more cabined. The PTAB itself recognized this
congressional purpose when it held that “[a]n inter partes review
is neither a patent examination nor a patent reexamination” but
is “a trial, adjudicatory in nature [which] constitutes
litigation.” 408 This different approach significantly affected the
patentee’s ability to amend his claims during the course of an
IPR. 409 The ability to amend during IPR is very limited even in
theory 410 and, as discussed in Part IV, ephemeral in practice. The
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“Claims yet
unpatented are to be given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the specification during the examination of a patent application since the
applicant may then amend his claims . . . .”).
405. See generally In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting), substituted opinion, 793 F.3d 1268
(Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
406. See id. at 1300 (observing that “Congress decided to start anew and
establish new post-grant review procedures, including IPR, in the AIA”).
407. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011).
408. Google Inc. v. Jongerius Panoramic Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00191,
Docket No. 50, at 4 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13 2014).
409. See supra notes 248–256 and accompanying text (discussing the
ramifications of the fact that the ability to amend is “absent in the AIA-created
procedures”).
410. There is no right to amend the claims in an IPR. A patentee who wishes
to amend the claims must seek permission of the Board to do so. 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.221(a) (2015). The petitioner is limited to only one motion. Id.; 35 U.S.C.
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practical inability to amend was also noted by the dissenting
judges in Cuozzo and obliquely recognized even by the Federal
Circuit’s panel majority. 411 This radical shift from an
examinational to an adjudicatory model, which deprives the
patentee of the actual ability to continue its pas de deux with the
PTO, is what separates inter partes reexamination from IPR. 412
Therefore, the AIA-mandated switch was not a mere technical
change to the procedures employed for the “second look” review
but a fundamental change to the review itself.
Given the fundamental differences between IPR and both ex
parte and inter partes reexamination, it cannot be gainsaid that
on September 16, 2011, patent holders lost significant property
rights in their existing patents. 413 This conclusion is bolstered by
the fact that a mere IPR request, even prior to the PTO’s decision
on whether to institute a full-blown trial on the matter, has
significant effects on the value of the underlying patent and even
on the price of the stock of the company that owns that patent. 414
Such a market reaction was not observed when reexamination (of
§ 316(d)(1) (2012). Additional motions to amend are not permitted unless on a
joint petition of a patentee and a patent challenger or for other “good cause
showing.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(c); see also 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (providing that
“the Director may, for good cause shown, extend the 1-year period by not more
than 6 months”).
411. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (recognizing that “the opportunity to amend is cabined in the IPR
setting”); id. at 1287–88 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“There is no right of
amendment in these new post-grant proceedings, and motions to amend are
rarely granted.”).
412. See id. at 1287 (“A critical difference between the standard procedure of
examination of pending applications, and these post-grant proceedings, is the
ready pre-grant availability of amendment of the claims.”).
413. See supra Part III.D (discussing the effects of the AIA post-issuance
review proceedings).
414. See, e.g., supra notes 237–240 and accompanying text (discussing the
relationship between AIA post-issuance review proceedings and financial
markets); see also Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy:
Dispute the Patent, Short the Stock, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 7, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazzpharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408 (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) (discussing the
strategy of “filing and publicizing patent challenges against pharmaceutical
companies while also betting against their shares”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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either kind) was requested. 415 This is evidence that the market
also considers IPR to be different from inter partes review in kind
rather than in mere procedure. For all these reasons, we conclude
that AIA-created IPR proceedings changed the boundary of
established patent rights and took from the patentees both the
settled scope of the patent and the presumption of validity that
attached thereto.
2. The Inchoateness Problem
Another objection to the claim that IPRs constitute a taking
is the fact that if the patentee is successful in an IPR, he would
have in fact lost nothing—and possibly gained something from
having his patent re-confirmed before a skeptical tribunal. 416
Thus, the argument goes, at best the AIA created an inchoate
taking, and, until a patent is actually invalidated, patentees have
little about which to complain. We disagree.
Though the mere creation of post-issuance review procedures
did not in and of itself invalidate any patent, it did change the
scope of existing patents and greatly diminished their value. 417 As
a result of these new procedures coming into being, patentees
have had reduced opportunities to license their patents or to
obtain fees commensurate with the pre-AIA value of the
patents. 418 This has affected all patentees whether or not their
415. See Robert Greene Sterne et al., Reexamination Practice with
Concurrent District Court Litigation or Section 337 USITC Investigations, 11
SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 20 (2010) (noting that patent owner’s stock price was subject
to significant fluctuations but only after a “significant decision” such as an
“[o]ffice action rejecting some or all of the claims of the patent in
reexamination,” but making no mention of price fluctuation upon the mere
decision to reexamine the patent).
416. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity,
Preliminary Relief, and Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 995, 1024–25 (2008) (“[O]nce a patent issues from an ex parte or inter
partes reexamination, the factual inference from the grant to its validity may be
significantly stronger than from the initial grant.”). The same logic would apply
to IPRs and CBMRs.
417. See supra notes 237–240 and accompanying text (noting, for instance,
that “the stock market reacted very negatively to the news that an IPR was
requested on a particular patent”).
418. See Richard Baker, Guest Post: America Invents Act Cost the US
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own patents have ever been subjected to a full-blown IPR trial. 419
Similarly, all patents, whether or not subject to the PTAB process
have had the boundaries of their right affected by the creation of
IPR and CBMR. The meaning of the claim has permanently
changed for all patents irrespective of whether they have been
haled before the PTAB. 420 For these reasons, IPRs are not a mere
inchoate problem that might only spring into being once a patent
is subjected to trial and then invalidated. Rather, the very
existence of IPRs has drastically affected the scope of patent
rights. 421
D. A Regulatory or a Physical Taking?
Once it is accepted that patents, like other real or personal
property, are subject to the Takings Clause and that the
post-issuance proceedings changed the scope of the property right
previously enjoyed by the patentee, the next question to ask is
whether the regime created by the AIA resulted in a physical or a
regulatory taking. If it was a physical taking, then, absent
compensation (which did not exist here), the action was
unconstitutional per se. 422 On the other hand, if this was
potentially a regulatory taking, then a more complex analysis is
required to determine the scope of loss and whether, if
uncompensated, the loss rises to a level of unconstitutional
Economy
over
$1
Trillion,
PATENTLYO.COM
(June
8,
2015),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/06/america-invents-trillion.html (last visited
Apr. 6, 2016) (noting that “US Patents have lost 2/3rds of their value since the
AIA was passed in 2011,” and a further drop of “10-15% [is expected] in the next
year or two”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
419. See id. (stating that the drop off in value is primarily due to “the impact
of the AIA IPR procedure”).
420. See supra notes 373–376 and accompanying text (discussing the “broad
boundaries” imposed on patents by the AIA, and noting that these boundaries
“may be as dangerous as narrow ones”).
421. See Baker, supra note 418 (noting “the impact[s] of the AIA IPR
procedure”).
422. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434
(1982) (noting that, where there “is a permanent physical occupation of
property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the
occupation”).
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violation. 423 In some sense, the very question posed by this Part
may seem silly. How can a patent—an incorporeal property—be
physically taken in the first place? Almost by definition, nonphysical property cannot be physically taken. And yet, in our
view, the answer is not so simple. Indeed, we conclude that the
AIA-created IPR may in fact contain analogies to a physical
taking of patents that existed prior to September 16, 2011 and
that there is an even stronger claim that a regulatory taking
occurred.
1. The Argument for a Physical Taking
As an initial matter, in our view it may be incorrect to
conclude that patents can never be physically taken because they
themselves are not physical property rights. Returning to our
earlier hypothetical, if the government were to simply re-assign
patent rights from person A to person B, it would be hard to
argue that such an action is any different from a situation where
the government takes land—or for that matter raisins—from one
person to give it to another. 424 If one is to consider seriously the
Supreme Court’s view that a “patent for an invention is as much
property as a patent for land [and] [t]he right rests on the same
foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same
sanctions,” 425 then it may follow that a physical taking can occur
with respect to each. But did a physical taking occur when
Congress created IPR?

423. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the regulatory taking analysis
undertaken in Horne v. Department of Agriculture).
424. Indeed, Congress has recognized as much. In 1954, Congress passed the
Atomic Energy Act, Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954), forbidding issuance of
patents “for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of
special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2181(a) (2012). Furthermore, Congress mandated cancellation of already
issued patents to this technology, essentially transferring the ownership to the
public. See id. § 2181(b) (“Any rights conferred by any patent heretofore granted
for any invention or discovery are hereby revoked . . . .”). However, Congress
provided for “just compensation” for the patent owners. Id.
425. Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876).
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To arrive at the conclusion that IPRs work a physical taking
of existing patents, we must, admittedly, work by analogy. In our
view, boundary changes with respect to a patent issued for an
invention are similar to boundary changes with respect to a
patent issued for a parcel of land. 426 The government has the
power to work some changes, but it must compensate the owner.
As the Supreme Court held in Loretto, the government cannot
simply change the boundaries of the property owner’s rights
without triggering the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 427 And let there be no mistake, the patent boundary
changes affected by the AIA are indeed permanent changes to the
patent boundaries. Though the IPRs come with estoppel
provisions, 428 these provisions apply only to a specific petitioner—
and even then incompletely. 429 Other challengers can continue to
seek and obtain IPRs against a patent multiple times over. 430 The
specter of IPR hovers over all patents no matter how many times
they were reexamined, were challenged in district or appellate
courts, or benefitted from the PTAB’s confirmation of the validity
of the patent. 431 Even if the threat of IPR could not be
characterized as a “permanent” invasion of a patentee’s property
interest—though in our opinion it should be so characterized—
repeated, albeit nominally “temporary,” invasions of property
rights can be as much of a taking as a permanent occupation
can. 432 Following this logic, courts may come to view the AIA’s
426. For a similar view, see Baker, supra note 418 (analogizing reversal of a
previously granted patent to a reversal of a deed).
427. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (explaining that depriving the owner of a
part of his property such as changing the boundaries of his property rights,
works a taking).
428. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012) (providing that “petitioner in an inter
partes review of a claim . . . that results in a final written decision . . . may not
request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with respect to that claim on
any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during
that inter partes review”).
429. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 935–44 (discussing
the ability to evade estoppel provisions).
430. See id. at 943 (discussing “stacking” IPR petitions).
431. See id. at 944 (“Given the structure of the IPR review process, there is
little to nothing that the patentee can do to prevent such abuse.”).
432. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519
(2012) (finding that “takings temporary in duration can be compensable”).
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changing of patent boundaries as a permanent invasion of the
patentee’s rights akin to a physical taking of land.
2. The Argument for a Regulatory Taking
Even if one is not convinced that the AIA worked the
equivalent to a physical taking, which is per se unconstitutional
unless compensated, one still needs to consider the possibility
that it worked a regulatory taking. The argument for this
position, in our view, is quite strong.
It is well established that, even though the government often
performs actions that diminish the value of property, not every
such action triggers the compensation requirement of the Takings
Clause. 433 Except in cases where “regulation . . . deprives land of
all economically beneficial use,” there is no per se rule requiring
compensation. 434 Instead, under Penn Central, the courts are
required to engage in an “essentially ad hoc and fact intensive”
balancing inquiry with particular attention to “the economic
impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable
investment backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action.” 435
As earlier studies have shown, the economic impact of
AIA-created post-issuance proceedings is quite severe. 436 Not only
does the existence of these processes affect the value of patents
for which review has been requested, it affects the value of
patents even pre-request. It has been reported that the value of
patents has dropped by two-thirds since and because of the AIA,
433. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”);
Radioptics, Inc. v. United States, 621 F.2d 1113, 1126 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (recognizing
that “not every interference with or encroachment upon a private property right
by the Government is entitled to compensation under the [F]ifth
[A]mendment”).
434. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
435. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523–24 (1998) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
436. See supra Part III.D (discussing the AIA’s “dramatic effects in the ‘real
world’”).
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with a further drop of 10%–15% expected in the next few years. 437
Additionally, it is now significantly harder for patentees to
license their patents, 438 and the value of the licenses actually
agreed to has been significantly reduced post-AIA. 439 The simple
reason for this unwillingness to pay for a license is the putative
infringer’s knowledge that all patents have been significantly
weakened through tinkering with their scope and the abolition of
the robust presumption of validity. 440 Alternatively, the putative
infringer or licensee knows that he can drive down the price of
the license by mere threat to tie up the patentee or his business
partners in protracted IPR proceedings during which time no one
would be imprudent enough to take a license to the patent in
question. 441 Thus, the economic impact of the AIA-created regime
on the patentees has been rather dramatic.
For the same reason, the AIA-created procedures
significantly interfered with patentees’ “investment-backed
expectations.” 442 Patents are obtained in expectation of profit. 443
437. See Baker, supra note 418 (reporting “a dramatic drop in the average
price per patent over the three year period, with values dropping 61% from
$422,286 per patent to $164,232,” and predicting “that patent values will drop
another 10-15% in the next year or two”).
438. See Michael Gulliford, If Patent Reform Is Meant to Starve Patent
Trolls, Why Is It Feeding Them Instead?, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 8, 2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/08/if-patent-reform-is-meant-to-starvepatent-trolls-why-is-it-feeding-them-instead/id=51067 (last visited Apr. 6, 2016)
(criticizing the “unintended consequences” of patent reform under the AIA) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
439. See Jack Lu, Patent Market Dynamics and the Impact of Alice and the
AIA, IPWATCHDOG (May 17, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/
05/17/patent-market-dynamics-aia-and-alice/id=57728 (last visited Apr. 6, 2016)
(reporting a “crash” in the patent market post-AIA) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
440. See Case, supra note 20, at 67–68 (arguing that the “AIA shakes
investor confidence. . . . [It also] shifts the risk–reward balance and will slow the
growth of America's innovative economy”); Lu, supra note 439 (discussing the
AIA’s impacts on the patent market).
441. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 944–47 (discussing
how “post-issuance review proceedings” can be “used to either settle scores with
patent owners or to strong-arm companies into more favorable licensing deals”).
442. Baker, supra note 418.
443. See F. Andrew Ubel, Who’s on First?—The Trade Secret Prior User or a
Subsequent Patentee, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401, 414 (1994)
(observing that “a primary goal of the patent system is to promote the
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Patentees invest not just their time, efforts, and money into
inventing, but also into more mundane activities like convincing
the PTO that their invention is worth exclusive rights that come
with the grant of a patent. Patentees pay attorneys’ fees, filing
fees, 444 maintenance fees, 445 etc., all in the hope of reaping some
economic reward from their inventive activity. They construct
their arguments and draft their claims with an expectation that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claims
and either steer clear of their property, allowing patentees to till
that field themselves or pay toll for the ability to work the
invention. 446 They also expect that once granted, the patent right
would not be easily upset and would only be cancelled upon the
showing of clear and convincing evidence. 447 This assurance of
“strong title rights” may well be the most valuable part of a
patent grant. The AIA, however, did away with all that. Whereas
the patentees carefully crafted their language and addressed it to
a reasonable artisan, the Patent Office requires that claims be
reviewed under a different standard—one that is contrary to the
patentee’s “investment backed expectations.” 448
We acknowledge that even post-AIA, the value of patents was
not reduced to zero, and therefore (if viewed through the
regulatory takings prism), the AIA-created mechanism is not a
advancement of science and useful arts by rewarding the inventor of new things
with an exclusive right to profit from the invention”).
444. For information on average legal fees to obtain a patent, see generally
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-85–I-87
(2015).
445. For information on fees associated with patent application, issuance,
and maintenance, see generally USPTO Fee Schedule, USPTO,
http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule
(last updated Jan. 1, 2016) (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
446. See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473,
1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the
invention through whose eyes the claims are construed.”).
447. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed
valid. . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof
shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that “§ 282 requires an invalidity
defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence”).
448. Baker, supra note 418.
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per se taking like the one in Lucas. 449 Nonetheless, the courts
have not insisted on a total loss of value to find a taking under
Penn Central, instead requiring significant reduction in value as
a result of the government’s actions. 450 Certainly, the AIA did
greatly diminish the value of all patents. 451 This loss of value is
not really matched by any benefits that have accrued to the
public as a result of the new law. While the authors of the Act
thought it would “provide[] more certainty, and reduce[] the cost
associated with filing and litigating patents,” 452 the exact
opposite has happened. 453 Thus, the “nature of the government’s
action” was not to broadly benefit the public but to make it easier
for some patent infringers to avoid having to bear the costs of
their infringement. 454 This was accomplished by transferring
those costs to the patentee and, in the process, destroying
significant amount of value in issued patents.
The upshot is that whether viewed as a physical taking or as
a regulatory taking, the AIA worked a great diminution of patent
values for all patentees. It did so by changing vested pre-existing
rights and upsetting expectations backed by significant
investments, all without conferring (even judging by the Act’s
authors’ own metrics) any clear benefit on the public. For these
449. See supra Part IV.C.4 (discussing the taking at issue in Lucas).
450. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1353–55
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (ruling that a statutory amendment that voided the claimant’s
right to pre-pay a government mortgage was a compensable taking, simply
because it was possible that a 96% diminution in return on investment would
result); Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding
that a 77% loss of the value of a flock of turkeys after a quarantine regulation
was enacted was a compensable taking).
451. See Baker, supra note 418 (“According to Scott Bechtel of AmiCOUR IP
Group, an experienced patent broker, ‘US Patents have lost 2/3rds of their value
since the AIA was passed in 2011.’”).
452. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 42 (2011).
453. See generally Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3 (discussing
how the AIA increased costs and reduced certainty).
454. See Terry Ludlow, Technology Patent Licensing Trends in 2015 and
Beyond,
CORP. COUNS. (Apr.
17,
2015),
http://www.law.com/sites/
articles/2015/04/17/technology-patent-licensing-trends-in-2015-and-beyond/#ixz
z3js6qPOfP (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) (“Look for more holdout behavior from
defendants as there is little incentive to settle early. Before making any
settlement offers, patents will be thoroughly tested through IPR filings . . . .”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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reasons, the application of the Act’s post-issuance review
provisions to patents granted prior to the effective date of the Act
constitutes a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
VI. Conclusion
At this point, only legislative or judicial intervention can
ensure that pre-existing property rights in patents are not
trampled by the AIA’s new procedures. There is no doubt that, in
the context of the AIA, procedural transformations have effected
a substantive change in the rights of patent owners. 455 The
government is free to modify its procedures for future patent
applicants, but owners whose rights vested before the AIA
became effective should not be subject to this kind of drastic
restriction of their investment-backed expectations. Allowing this
to occur, and thus creating a legal regime that permits retroactive
tectonic shifts, also sets a dangerous precedent for other areas of
intellectual property and property law such as to disincentivize
innovation and reliance on the law.
The government has only a limited number of solutions to
the identified constitutional violation. One of them, and the
easiest, is not to make pre-AIA patents subject to the post-AIA
procedures. Another is to roll back those procedures for everyone,
by requiring the PTO to use the same claim construction
standards as have always been used by the district courts. This
approach has the support of nearly half the Federal Circuit
judges, and of a number of legislators, albeit for reasons
unrelated to the issue of takings. Last, the government can
provide just compensation to patent owners whose rights vested
before the AIA became effective. This last option could, however,
quickly become prohibitively expensive if enough owners come
forward, and the calculation of the proper levels of compensation
will present its share of headaches. Hence, we have cause to
believe that adopting one of the first two options will be the most
plausible solution to the problem we present in this Article.
455. See generally Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret
Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing the relationship
between procedural and substantive rights in the national security context).
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Additionally, Congress should take care to avoid such
constitutional conundrums in future legislation that has the
potential to affect retroactively the rights of intellectual property
and property owners.

